1. - This petition in revision is directed against the order of the Additional District Judge, Sirohi, dated July 30, 1974. where by he upheld the under of the Munsiff, Abu Road, rejecting the application for grant of temporally injunrtion.

2. It appears that the respondent Municipal Board, Pindwara, deman ded arrears of house-tax from the plaintiffs and other house-tax payers of Pindwara for the last three years, namely, 1967 68, 1968-69 and 1969-70. The plaintiffs thereupon, in their representative capacity, on behalf of all the house-tax payers of Pindwara filed the suit that no house-tax was payable by them. They pleaded a number of grounds in support of their non-liability to-pay the house-tax. Along with the plaint, the plaintiffs moved an application for granting temporary injunction restraining the defendant from realising the house-tax during the pendency of the suit. The learned Munsiff issued an ex-parte ad interim injunction order against the defendant but later on, after hearing the parties, he vacated that order vide his order dated November 30, 1973 Dissatisfied with the said order, that the plaintiff-petitioners filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Sirohi, but without any success.. It is against this order of the Additional District Judge, Sirohi, that the plaintiff-appellants have preferred this revision petition.

3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case.

4. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has contended that there existed no prima facie case in favour of the petitioners in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of City of Hubli v. Subha Rao Hanumantharao Prayag and Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1389 . I, however, do not wish to express any opinion at this stage on merits of the case.

5. The learned Additional District Judge, while dismissing the appeal, observed as under:

Learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellants has contended that the recovery of the tax is illegal, but I would not like to express any opinion on this aspect of the matter because the suit is still pending and this is a matter which will be decided by the trial court at the time of final disposal of the suit. For the granting of an injunction it is not sufficient that the plaintiff has a prima facie case. The prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss should be in favour of the plaintiff before an injunction can be issued or confirmed. One of these three things alone will not be sufficient Assuming that the prima facie case is there, I am inclined to agree with the learned Mursiff that the balance of convenience is in favour of the Board. If the Board is prevented from realising the tax, it may not be able to pay the salary of its employees and may not be able to perform other public duties which involve considerable expenditure. In case the suit is ultimately decreed, the plaintiffs, in my opinion, will m t have any difficulty in getting back the tax paid by them.
It is vehemently contended that in case the plaintiffs were required to deposit the arrears of house tax during the pendency of the suit, it would be impossible for them to recover the same from the Municipal Board in case the suit was ultimately decreed, as the Board is indebted to the tune of Rs. 93,000/-. It has also been contended that it would be a difficult task for each individual tax payer to get refuted of the small amount ranging from Rs. 10/- onwards in case the suit was decided in favour of the plaintiffs. The learned Counsel for the non-petitioner, on the other hand, supported the impugned order.

6. I hive considered the matter and, in my opinion it would be in the interest of justice if the plaintiff-petitioners are directed to deposit the amount of arrears of house-tax for the years 1967-68, 1968-69 and 1969-70 in the trial court, on the condition that the trial court, on such deposit, open a joint Savings Bank Account in a Scheduled Bank in the name of