1. - Aggrieved by the order dated 09.04.2010, passed by the learned District Judge, Ajmer, whereby the learned Judge has returned the plaint of the plaintiff-appellant for its presentation before the revenue court, the appellant has challenged the said order before this Court.

2. In brief, the facts of the case are that on 29.03.2010, the plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction under Section 34/38 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 ('the Act', for short) against the defendants-respondents. In the suit a relief was sought for declaration of title on the basis of adverse possession and a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants-respondents from causing any hindrance in use and occupation of the subject land. On 30.03.2010, on the occasion of check-report, the learned court below raised an objection as to the jurisdiction of the civil court for trying the subject suit. The objection of the court below was that the subject suit was triable by a revenue court. Vide order dated 09.04.2010, the learned court below concluded that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the subject suit can only be entertained by the revenue court. Resultantly, the plaint was returned to the plaintiff-appellant. Hence, this appeal before this Court.

3. Mr. S.K. Saksena, the learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that there is nothing in the plaint to show that the land in dispute was agricultural in nature. Therefore, the learned Judge has erred in concluding that the land in dispute was agricultural in nature. Moreover, the suit was filed for declaration and permanent injunction. Both the matters are of civil nature. Thus, the subject matters are covered under the jurisdiction of a civil court. Hence, the learned Judge was not justified in returning the plaint and directing that the appellant should approach the revenue court. Thirdly, in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, the civil remedy is the only remedy available. In order to buttress this contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of Madho Singh & Ors. v. Mohi Singh (D) By LRs. & Ors., 2004 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 728 and on the case of Abdulla Bin Ali & Ors. v. Galappa & Ors., (1985) 2 SCC 54 .

4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the impugned order as well as case law submitted at the bar.

5. A bare perusal of the impugned order clearly reveals that the learned Judge has noticed the fact that in the plaint, the plaintiff-appellant has claimed that the land in dispute is an agricultural land and it is shown as agricultural land even in the revenue records. Since the learned counsel for the appellant claims that no such admission is made by the appellant, this Court asked the learned counsel to show any evidence that the said land was converted from agricultural to non-agricultural usage. To this query, the learned counsel frankly conceded that there is no such evidence available on record. Since all land is presumed to agricultural in nature, until and unless it is converted by an appropriate authority, therefore, the learned Judge is certainly justified in concluding that the land in dispute is an agricultural land, even if such an admissions were not made by the appellant.

6. Moreover, the learned Judge is also justified in concluding that while deciding the question of jurisdiction, the court is to go by the plaint which has been submitted before it. However, simultaneously the court does have the power to lift the veil and to see the actual nature of relief being sought by the plaintiff. While lifting the veil, the learned Judge has validly concluded that since the land in question is agricultural in nature, the only rights that would be declared in favour of the plaintiff would be the rights of a "Khatedar". Since "khatadari rights" can only be declared by a revenue court, the learned Judge is justified in concluding that the civil court would not have jurisdiction to en