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2009 Supreme(Raj) 2418

RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT AT JAIPUR BENCH
R.S.Chauhan, J.
Mohammad Ameen and Another - Appellant
Versus
The State of Rajasthan and Another - Respondent
S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 1188 of 2009.
Decided On : 4-11-2009

Advocates:
For the Petitioners:Kapil Gupta, Advocate.

The territorial jurisdiction of a court to try an offence is determined by the place where the offence was committed, and the cause of action includes every fact that is necessary to be proved to support the right or grievance of the complainant.

Headnote:

JURISDICTION - DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961 - SECTION 4/6 - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 - SECTION 406, 498-A - Territorial jurisdiction of the court to try an offence - Interpretation of Section 177 Cr.P.C. - Scope of the cause of action - Determination of the place where the offence was committed.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners challenged the order framing charges against them for offences under Sections 498-A & 406 IPC and under Section 4/6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The complainant alleged acts of cruelty by the petitioners, but none of the incidents occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at Kekri.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the charge order framed by the Magistrate was beyond his territorial jurisdiction as no part of the offence occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at Kekri.

Issues: 1. Whether the court at Kekri had territorial jurisdiction to try the case. 2. Interpretation of Section 177 Cr.P.C. and the scope of the cause of action.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 177 Cr.P.C. provides that an offence is to be tried by the court in whose territorial jurisdiction the offence is alleged to have been committed. 2. The cause of action includes every fact that is necessary to be proved to support the right or grievance of the complainant. 3. In the present case, all the acts of cruelty occurred either at Jaipur or Kapasan, and no part of the offence occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at Kekri. Therefore, the Magistrate did not have jurisdiction to try the case.

Final Decision: The petition was allowed, and the impugned order framing charges was quashed and set aside.

JUDGMENT

1. - The petitioners have challenged the order dated 23.04.2009 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Kekri, District Ajmer whereby the learned Magistrate has framed the charges for offences under Section 498-A & 406 IPC and under Section 4/6 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the respondent No.1, Mohammad Ameen and charge for offence under Section 498-A IPC against the respondent No.2, Anwar.

2. Mr. Kapil Gupta, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has contended that according to Section 177 Cr.PC., an offence is to be tried by the Court in whose territorial jurisdiction the offence is. said to have occurred. However, in the present case, no offence has occurred within the territorial jurisdiction falling within the ambit of the Judicial Magistrate, Kekri. Therefore, he is not in a position to try the case. Secondly, according to the complainant-respondent, Smt. Shaheen @ Dilasba, all the acts of cruelty had taken place either at Jaipur where she was residing with her husband, Mohammad Ameen, or at Kapasan where her in-laws' were residing. According to her statement, not a single incident had taken place at her village Jaswantapura which falls within Tehsil Kekri, District Ajmer. However, the complainant-respondent has filed her complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, Kekri. Therefore, the Judicial Magistrate, Kekri does not have the territorial jurisdiction to try the case. Furthermore, In order to buttress his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. v. Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr., 2004 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 597 : AIR 2004 Supreme Court 4286 .

3. On the other hand, Ms. Alka Bhatnagar, the learned public prosecutor, has contended that according to the complainant-respondent, the petitioner No.1 and complainant had gctten married within the territorial jurisdiction of Kekri Court. Therefore, the complainant was competent to file her complaint before the court at Kekri.

4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order as well as considered the case law cited at the Bar.

5. In the case of Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:

The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the Code it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused.

While in civil cases, normally the expression "cause of action" is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression "cause of action" is, therefore, not a stranger to criminal cases.

It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it Is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise.

The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is nece








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