The main legal principle established in the judgment is that the power of review is not limited to statutory provisions and can be exercised for administrative orders. The court also clarified the distinction between administrative and quasi judicial orders.

1. - Heard learned counsel for the appellants as well as counsel for the 1 caveator.The simple issue raised by the petitioners is sought to be complicated by him by adverting to and invoking the principle that authority to review the quasi judicial orders depends on statute or exercise of legislative power by 5 the executive without due authority invalidating the act in case which relates to revocation or a putting in abeyance suspension order passed by the authority who has passed he order earlier during the pendency of the inquiry.The respondent No. 3 who was elected as Sarpanch was suspended by order dated 16.6.2003 by the Divisional Commissioner as a delegate of State under Section 38(4) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. By order dated 25th August, 2003, the very same authority on considering that it appears to be a case of cross complaint on the basis of community bias, put in abeyance the order passed by him earlier resulting the reinstatement. Ordinarily, no contention could have been raised against this order inasmuch as the principle that the authority who has power of making an order of suspension has also power to revoke the same appropriately applies to the facts of the present case and in such matters, apart form the concerned person who has been put under suspension during the pendency of inquiry, 20 its revocation does not give a cause of action to others.The petitioners who are amalgam of Up-sarpanch alongwith other nominated members chose to challenge the order dated 28.2.2003 alleging it to be without authority. It was contended that while State Government, which is authority empowered to make an order of suspension under Section 38(4) 25 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 was empowered to revoke or put in abeyance the order passed by it, its delegate could not exercise that power. The source of power of the State to revoke the suspension order emanates from the provisions of Section 97(4) of the Act of 1994.It was also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power of review is a creature of Statute and unless Statute provides for it, no authority can review its own order. Reliance was placed upon Patel Narshi Thakersi and Others v. Pradhyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , H.C. Suman and another v. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees Co-operative House Building Society Ltd., New Delhi and Others, AIR 1991 SC 2160 and Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority & Ors. v. Sharadkumar Jayantikumar Pasawaila & Ors. JT 1992(3) SC 417 . The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 12.2.2004 under appeal.

2. None of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant merits acceptance. Section of the Act of 1994 relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in furtherance of the contention raised by h'm does not assist him. Section 97(3) confers power of revision or review on the government.

3. So far as Sub-section (1) and Sub - section (2) of Section 97 are concerned, they relate to exercise of revisional power by the State in respect of orders passed by any authority other than the State under the provisions the Act or to say it enables the State Government to revise orders passed by any authority under the Act which is subordinate to it. Sub-section (3) confers upon the State Government, the power to review its own order passed under Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) of Section 97. Sub-sections (1) and (2) confers power upon State to stay execution of any such decision which is being subjected to revision.We may notice that the order under Sub-section (1) can only be passed after giving an opportunity of hearing to the person effected thereby and, therefore, it is apparent that power exercisable under Sub-section (1) of Section 97 and Sub-section (2) of Section 97 in exercise of quasi judicial power by the superior authority are its State are like the powers exercisable by the subordinate authorities under the Act. If