1. - Whether the power of superintending control conferred on Board of Revenue by section 221 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 (for short 1955 Act') is similar to the control exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is the core question springing up for our consideration in the instant appeal.

2. This question emerges in the circumstances set out below:

(i) The land in dispute was recorded as Khudkast land of ancestors of the appellants in Samvat 2007-12.

(ii) On March 13, 1953 an application was filed by the respondents under section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure and land in question was attached.

(iii) On April 19, 1955 the Sub Divisional Magistrate Bharatpur decided the matter in favour of the respondents and they were put In possession.

(iv) The High Court on Jan. 5, 1956 quashed and set aside the order dated April 19, 1955 and remanded the matter to Sub Divisional Magistrate for fresh decision.

(v) On Feb. 13, 1956 the Sub Divisional Magistrate reattached the land in question and issued notice for recovery of sale money.

(vi) On August 22, 1958 the Sub Divisional Magistrate Bharatpur again decided the matter in favour of the respondents. However, the High Court again set aside the order dated August 22, 1958 vide order dated September 7, 1960 and remanded the matter.

(vii) On October 24, 1960 the land in question was again attached and was given on supurdagi.

(viii) On January 30, 1963 the matter was sent for enquiry to Civil Court.

(ix) On May 10, 1963 both the parties arrived at a compromise and admitted possession of the appellants upon different parts of land. The Civil Court recorded its findings on the basis of admissions made in the compromise.

(x) On May 31, 1963 the SDM disposed of the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.PC. and directed for handing over possession of the different parts of the land to the respective parties and also directed them not to interfere in possession of each other. The attachment was accordingly removed and the sale money was also ordered to be given to the appellants.

(xi) On June 6, 1963 the Sub Divisional Magistrate handed over possession of the land to the respective parties. The appellants filed suit on September 18, 1965 for declaration of Khatedari rights, correction of revenue record and permanent injunction. Along with the suit application for temporary injunction was also filed which was decided in favour of the appellants.

(xii) On March 21, 1970 the respondents filed a cross suit for permanent injunction against the appellants. However, the application seeking temporary injunction was dismissed vide order dated April 2, 1970.

(xiii) On July 26, 1970 the suit filed by the respondents was also dismissed in default and was never restored.

(xiv) On January 18, 1972 the parties again arrived at a compromise and suit was decreed in terms of compromise. The District Collector initiated proceedings under section 232 of 1955 Act on the ground that decree dated January 18, 1972 was hit by section 42 of 1955 Act. The matter was examined thoroughly and District Collector ultimately found that violation of section 42 was not made. The District Collector, therefore, rejected the prayer of making reference to the Board of Revenue under section 232 on August 16, 1978.

(xv) After becoming unsuccessful on all fronts the respondent in 1987, i.e., after 15 years filed application under section 221 of 1955 Act seeking quashing of the decree dated January 18, 1972. The Board of Revenue in exercise of its power of superintending control allowed the application vide order dated Feb. 19, 1997 and set aside the decree. The appellants filed review petition but it was also dismissed on June 30, 1997. After dismissal of writ petition by learned Single Judge on August 24, 2000, the appellants have preferred the instant appeal challenging the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue to quash a valid decree under the power of superintendence provided by Section 221 of 1955 Act.

3. We have g