The main legal point established in the judgment is the authority of the Urban Improvement Trust to settle disputes under Section 96 of the Urban Improvement Trust Act, emphasizing the two-way process of settlement and the preservation of parties' rights to have their rights determined through appropriate forums.

1. - Heard learned Counsel for the parties.FACTS ABOUT CIVIL SECOND APPEAL NO. 91/2001

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge No. 3, Jodhpur in Civil Appeal No. 39/95 dated 5.12.2000.

2. The first appeal filed by the present appellant UIT, Jodhpur was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Jodhpur who affirmed the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court namely the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate No. 6, Jodhpur dated 7.3.1995.

3. A civil suit was filed by the plaintiffs-respondents No. 1 to 6 somewhere in 1990 for restraining the UIT, Jodhpur from interfering with the land comprised in Khasra No. 771 measuring 54.4 bighas. According to the claim of the plaintiffs, the land in question was sold by Dhula Parihar on 4.7.1966 to one Ved Prakash. The said Ved Prakash transferred that land in favour of Late Patric Viscent and the plaintiffs-respondents No. 1 and 2 on 27.9.1966 by a registered sale-deed and the purchasers were put in possession of the land on the same date. The said Patric Viscent died on 30.8.1989. Plaintiffs No. 3 to 6 are heirs and legal representatives of said Patric Viscent. It was also alleged that after purchasing the agricultural land, an application was made by the original purchaser Patric Viscent and plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 for conversion of the land for non-agricultural use, which conversion application was allowed and the land was converted into residential purposes. Separate Pattas were issued in the names of holders on 24.4.1989. The order dated 24.4.1989 was appealed before the learned Revenue Appellate Authority by the State through the Tehsildar, which appeal was rejected on 4.10.1989. Thereafter, on receipt of a notice from the UIT on 28.7.1990 by treating the possession of the plaintiffs to be as trespassers required them to remove their encroachment, the notice was replied to and they produced the relevant documents before the Officer of the Urban Improvement Trust. However, seeing that the Urban Improvement Trust is not responding to their claim, they filed the present suit.

4. No written statement was filed by the defendants-appellants even after several opportunities and the right to file the written statement was ultimately closed by the trial Court. In response to the evidence led by the plaintiffs, no evidence in rebuttal was led by the defendants. In the trial Court it was argued that the land in question was not entered in the name of Dhula Ram or any other name in the land records and, therefore, they could not have created any rights in plaintiffs by transfers, and plaintiffs did not acquire any rights in the property. It was also claimed that after the alleged transfers, on 19.4.1978 the land in question was placed at the disposal of UIT by the State and it was mutated in the name of UIT. However, such pleas were not supported by any evidence. The trial Court in the absence of any contrary material has decreed the suit in toto.

5. On appeal it was contended by the appellant-defendant before the First Appellate Court that the land in question was not recorded in the name of Dhula Ram and therefore, the plaintiffs did not acquire any right through the deed of transfer and that an earlier attempt to convert the land for non-agricultural use was proved abortive, which fact has not been disclosed by the plaintiffs in the subsequent proceedings for conversion which terminated in favour of the plaintiffs.

6. The learned appellate Judge also found that no evidence, oral or documentary, is available on record to support their contentions and in view of the existing material on the record of the case, the appeal was dismissed and the decree passed by the trial Court was affirmed.

7. Hence, this second appeal. Before admission of the case, it was brought to the notice of the Court by learned Counsel for the appellant that the plaintiffs have transferred the entire land in question to the differ