A litigant who has entered into a compromise in respect to the subject matter of litigation cannot subsequently raise issues that were not raised before the higher courts in the hierarchy of courts.

1. - Heard the parties. Petitioner's father was a tenant of respondents' father in two shops situated in Gopalji Ka Rasta, Jaipur. The landlords filed suit for eviction of the petitioner, who had succeeded his late father, as a tenant. Trial court decreed the suit in favour of the landlords on 10.10.79. Feeling aggrieved against the decree passed by the trial court, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the first appellate court. The first appellate court passed order dated 27.5.92 remanding the case to the trial court for re-trial and re-hearing of the same afresh. The landlords as well as the petitioner tenant felt aggrieved against such orders of the learned first appellate court and approached the High Court. This Court set-aside the order of remand as passed by the learned first appellate court and sending the case back to him, directed him to hear the parties and decide the appeal on merits. In compliance of such directions of the High Court, the first appellate court heard the parties and dismissed the petitioner's appeal on 13.11.87. The petitioner approached the High Court against the appellate court decree. When the matter was pending before the High Court, parties entered into a compromise in terms of which both the parties agreed to retain one shop each. Subsequently, the petitioner requested the court to review its order on the ground of some mistake. Review petition was dismissed by this Court on 13.5.88. Petitioner feeling aggrieved against the order passed by the High Court on his review petition, approached the Apex Court through Special Leave Petition No. 4146/91, Girraj Prasad v. Jamna Dass , which was also dismissed.

2. In the above background, the contention of the petitioner is that when his appeal was pending before the learned first appellate court, the respondent landlords had filed certain affidavits which were false to their knowledge and wherein they had wrongly stated that they were the landlords of the petitioner. The petitioner further submitted that he had required the learned first appellate court to initiate proceedings under section 340 Cr.P.C. against the respondents and to prosecute them for offence under section 193 IPC. The application so presented by the petitioner has been dismissed by the learned first appellate court vide his impugned order dated 29.8.97. It is against that order dated 29.8.97 dismissing petitioner's application under section 340 Cr.P.C., that the petitioner has approached this Court by way of a petition under section 482 Cr.P.C.

3. Arguing his case himself, the petitioner submitted that since the respondents had filed affidavits containing wrong facts before the first appellate court in the year 1986, they had committed offence of perjury punishable under section 193 IPC and that the learned first appellate court should have directed the filing of a complaint under Section 193 IPC against them. On repeated quarry from the Bench, the petitioner could not satisfactorily explain as to why such a contention was not raised by him when the second appeal preferred by both the parties had come up for decision before this court and in compliance of the orders of this Court, the first appellate court had heard the parties and dismissed his appeal vide his order dated 13.11.87. He could not further explain as to why such a point was not raised by him in his review petition as also before the Supreme Court. On a specific query from the Bench, as to who was the landlord of the petitioner, he came out with the contention that though his father had been admitted as a tenant by the father of the respondents in the two shops, yet, the present respondents had wrongly stated themselves to be the landlords of the petitioner in the affidavits filed by them before the first appellate Court. He did not deny that the parties had entered into a compromise before the High Court and in terms of the compromise, he was allowed to retain one shop and possession of the other shop was deliv