The principle of judicial discipline and propriety requires that where a bail application of an accused has been rejected by the High Court, the Sessions Court should not allow a subsequent bail application unless new/changed substantial circumstances and facts have come into existence.

1. - An FIR was lodged by the complainant-petitioner, at Police Station-Lalsot, on 19.12.96, whereupon, a case under Sections 147, 458, 302 & 325, IPC, was registered by the police. After the necessary investigation, the challan was submitted, and the learned trial court framed charges for offences under Sections 147, 458, 302/149, 323 & 323/149, IPC, against the accused persons. During the trial, the accused-non-petitioner No. 1, Mohanlal, moved a bail application under Section 439, Cr.P.C., before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dausa, who dismissed the same on 17.7.98. Thereafter, he moved before this Court, S.B. Cr. Misc. Bail Application No. 4033/97, and the same was rejected on 15.10.97, because, the trial has begun and seven witnesses have already been examined. Thereafter, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, was recorded, and the accused-non-petitioner No. 1, Mohanlal moved a bail application before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dausa, who, vide his order dated 27.10.98, allowed the same and released him on bail. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the petitioner-complainant has moved this application, for cancellation of the bail of the accused-non-petitioner No. 1, Mohanlal, under Section 439(2), Cr.P.C.

2. I have heard the arguments of both the sides.

3. In the case of Smt. Bimla Devi v. State of Bihar & another 1994 Cr.LJ 638 (SC) , Hon'ble the Supreme Court has laid down the proposition of law that where a bail application has been rejected by the High Court, the lower court should not grant even provisional bail, otherwise, the principle of judicial discipline & propriety would be adversely affected.

4. In the case of Padam Chand Jain v. State of Rajasthan 1990(1) RLW 18 , this Court has held that "I have no doubt in mind that on the same material, if this Court has already dismissed a application for bail, filed by an accused, the learned Sessions Judge, should not allow the bail application" and that ''the order of the learned Sessions Judge, allowing the bail to the accused-non-petitioner, cannot be sustained."

5. Thus, the principle of judicial discipline & propriety requires & demands that where a bail application of an accused has been rejected by the High Court, the Sessions Court should not allow a subsequent bail application, until & unless new/changed substantial circumstances & facts have come into existence since the rejection of the bail application by the High Court. New/changed substantial circumstances & facts would not mean a mere cosmetic change, but would imply substantial & material change in the facts & circumstances. Mere examination of the prosecution witnesses in the learned trial court, does not mean that any material or substantial change in the circumstances & facts, has cropped up, unless, it is shown that some new/changed material fact or circumstance has come on record which is distinct from the one, available in the evidence, recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., during the investigation and due to such change, release on bail has become necessary.

6. A perusal of the impugned order dated 27.10.98, passed by the learned Additional Sessions* Judge, Dausa, would show that it has not been mentioned in the order, what material facts & circumstances have changed and have come on record, which have necessitated the release of the accused-non-petitioner No. 1 on bail. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has not mentioned the new substantial grounds for bail, which have arisen since the last order of rejection of bail.

7. The learned Additional Sessions judge, vide the impugned order, has granted the bail, to the accused-non-petitioner No. 1, on the ground that he is not the author of the fatal injury. The High Court rejected the bail application of the accused-non-petitioner No. 1, on 15.10.97, wherein it has been mentioned that the trial has begun and seven witnesses have been examined. This meant that the eye witnesses Rajesh (PW 3) and Ganpat (PW 4) were already exam