A court may order the medical examination of a person for the purpose of determining mental disorder when there is a genuine need for such examination, even if the person objects to the examination.

1. 1. Heard.

2. Perused the order impugned.

3. In a divorce petition under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 filed on the ground of mental disorder, the plaintiff- husband-non petitioner moved an application to the effect that his wife, the present revisionist, is of unsound mind, therefore, her medical examination is necessary in the interest of justice. The aforesaid application for medical examination was moved by the non petitioner- husband after he was examined on oath before the Court wherein he has deposed to the effect that the revisionist is of unsound mind.

4. The learned trial Court after giving cogent and convincing reasons allowed the application for medical examination of the revisionist aggrieved against which she has filed this revision.

5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the revisionist that unless some prima facie evidence is gathered by the learned trial Court relating to the revisionist's unsound mind, her medical examination cannot be ordered.

6. Indisputably before passing the order impugned for medical examination of the revisionist the learned Additional District Judge No. 1 Hanumangarh, Camp at Sangaria has examined the non petitioner-husband on oath. It is apparent on the face of record that after taking into account the depositions of the non petitioner husband and his averments made in paragraphs No. 4 and 5 in the divorce petition the learned trial Court has passed the order impugned. Thus the argument of the learned counsel for the revisionist to the effect that in the present case the learned trial Court has passed the order impugned for medical examination of the revisionist without any prima facie evidence relating to her husband mind is untenable and it is hereby repelled.

7. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the revisionist that the learned trial Court has committed jurisdictional error in refusing to rely on the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of Gujarat High Court in the case of Bipinchandra Shantilal Bhatt v. Madhuriben Bhatt reported in AIR 1963 Gujarat 250 , According to the learned counsel for the revisionist the controversy involved in the present revision is squarely covered by the decision rendered in the case of Bipinchandra Shantilal Bhatt (supra).

8. Coming to the next contention raised by the learned counsel for the revisionist it is revealed from perusal of the order impugned passed by the learned trial Court that three judgments of different High Courts were cited before it but is respectfully preferred to rely on a decision rendered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of G. Venkatanarayana v. Kurupati Laxmi Devi reported in AIR 1985 A.P. 1 , wherein the other two judgments one rendered by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Bipinchandra Shantilal Bhatt (supra) and another decision rendered in the case of Smt. Revamma v. Sri Shanthappa reported in AIR 1972 Mysore 157 , were dissented by the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High. Court holding that Section 14 of the Evidence Act does not exclude examination of mental or bodily state of a person. It is further ruled in the case of G. Venkatanarayana (supra) that there is no deprivation of personal liberty or breach of Art. 21 of the Constitution involved in the medical examination of the human body. I respectfully concur with the view taken in the case of G. Venkatanarayana (supra). I have the misfortune to be unable to agree with the erudite opinions of the learned Judges expressed by them in the two decisions rendered in the cases of Bipinchandra Shantilal Bhatt (supra) and Smt. Revamma (supra). Thus I have no hesitation to hold that the learned trial Court in the present case has committed no jurisdictional error in following the conventional rule of precedent in passing the order impugned. The binding nature of judicial decision stems either from constitutional or from statutory provisions or from conventions which the Court observe in the administrati