The discretion of fixing the date from which the standard rent is payable lies with the trial court, and the appellate court should provide cogent and justified reasons for modifying this date.

1. From the record of the revision petition No. 510/98 I find that defendant non-petitioner No. 2 has expired. His heirs and legal representatives have not been brought on record. He was the partner of the defendant non-petitioner No. 1 firm which is duly represented by the Advocate. Thus, non-bringing on record the heirs and legal representatives of defendant non-petitioner No. 2 is inconsequential. That apart it is no more res integra the provisions of Order 22 of the CPC are not applicable to the revision petition filed under Section 115 of the CPC. Last but not least, the defendant non-petitioner No. 1 firm is there and the defendant non-petitioner No. 2 was only the partner thereof.

2. In these two revision petitions purely a legal question has been raised for consideration of this Court by the learned counsel for the plaintiff petitioners, therefore, they are taken up for hearing together and being decided by this common order

3. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the revision petitions.

4. In the suit for fixation of standard rent of the suit premises, the shop, situated in Sarrafa Bazar, Bharatpur, the learned trial court fixed the standard rent of Rs. 112.50p. It was made effective from 1st of March, 1976 (rounding 23.2.1976, the date of filing of the suits). The tenants carried the matter in appeal. The learned appellate court did not make any interference in the judgment of the learned trial court as to relate to fixation of standard rent of the suit premises of Rs. 112.50p. but it was ordered to be payable from 17th of September, 1982 in stead of 1st March, 1976. That date has been fixed as on that date the power of attorney holder of the plaintiff has stated on oath establishing the fact that looking to the present circumstances the rent of the disputed premises was very low.

5. The learned counsel for the plaintiff petitioners submitted that this matter is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 213 of 1981, Dharamveer Kaliya v. Khem Singh & Others. He further submitted that in Miran v. Birbalram, their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that even if there is no provision in the Act as to from which date the standard rent may be fixed, obviously and generally it is to be fixed from the date of the application and accordingly orders were passed that the standard rent shall be payable from the date of the suit.

6. Sub-section (5) of Section 6 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, though it is repealed but applicable to these matters, provides that in every case in which the court determines the standard rent of any premises under this Section, it shall appoint a date from which the standard rent so determined shall be deemed to have effect. This provision, no doubt, empowers the Court to appoint a date from which the standard rent so determined shall be deemed to have effect and it can be the date of the suit or any other date there after. Discretion of fixing the date from which the standard rent is payable, lies with the trial court. The learned trial court exercising its discretion has appointed the date from which the standard rent is payable. The appellate court has not given any cogent and justified reason to modify this date. The learned appellate court where it was not accepting the decision of the learned trial court was to give cogent and satisfactory reasons and grounds of disagreement. The reason given by the learned appellate court is wholly perverse. It has no relevance to the matter in issue. The learned appellate court arbitrarily fixed the date on which the statement of the power of attorney holder of the plaintiff was recorded. How it has any relevance or nexus or any consideration to the date from which the standard rent determined by the learned trial court is made payable. It appears an order passed by the learned appellate court being a superior court not to accept the decision of