Interest pendent lite under Section 34 CPC can only be awarded when there is a decree for payment of money.

1. - Heard.

2. Facts are not in dispute that the plaintiff-appellants had sanctioned a term loan of Rs. 75,000/- in favour of respondent No. 1 on 7.9.1981. An amount of Rs. 95,489.96 was given by the plaintiff. Bank by means of a pay order dated 7.9.1981 which included the margin money deposited with the plaintiff. It is also not in dispute that the plaintiff-appellant filed a suit No. 173 of 1986 against the respondents for recovery of Rs. 42,106.66 being the amount due in the term loan account of respondent No. 1 as on 1.7.1984. During the pendency of Civil Suit No. 173 of 1986, respondent No. 1 made various payments to the plaintiff Bank as have been detailed in the memorandum of appeal by the appellant. From 31.10.1984 to 9.9.1987, respondent No. 1 paid a total amount of Rs. 42,121.66 to the plaintiff Bank and the same were accepted by the latter. An amount of Rs. 15/- was deducted on account of commission on 21.11.1984. Thus the entire amount claimed in the suit with respect to the said term loan stood repaid by the respondent No. 1 before the suit was decided by the Additional District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur on 14.12.1987.

3. This appeal has been filed by the plaintiff Bank only for two purposes. First is that the trial Court was wrong in not allowing to the plaintiff interest pendent lite at the rate of 17-112% despite the fact that an amount of Rs. 42,106.66 were due against the respondents on the date the plaintiff Bank had filed the suit. The other ground taken is that even costs of the suit had not been awarded to the plaintiff Bank by the trial Court and the trial Court has wrongly left the party to bear their own costs.

4. It is an undisputed fact that the entire amount claimed in the suit in respect of the term loan of Rs. 42,106.66 stood paid by the respondent No. 1 to the plaintiff Bank during the pendency of the suit and the amount was accepted by the Bank. The result was that no amount in respect of term loan was out-standing as against the respondents on the date the trial Court decided the suit on 14.12.1987. No money decree was, therefore, passed against the respondents. The only provision under which interest pendent lite can be allowed by a Court is contained in Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Section 34 CPC reads as under :

"34. Interest.

(1) Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, (with further interest at such rate not exceeding six per cent, per annum, as the Court deems reasonable on such principal sum) from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit.

Provided that where the liability in relation to the sum so adjudged had arisen out of a commercial transaction, the rate of such further interest may exceed six per cent, per annum, but shall not exceed the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contractual rate, the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to commercial transactions.

Explanation I.-In this sub-section "nationalised bank" means a corresponding new bank as defined in the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970.

Explanation II.-For the purposes of this section, a transaction is a commercial transaction, if it is connected with the industry, trade or business of the party incurring the liability.

(2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest on such principal sum from the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date, the Court shall be deemed to have refused such interest, and a separate suit therefor shall not lie."

5. The language of Section 34 Cr.P.C. makes it clear that the Court can