The delay in issuing the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act did not render the exercise of power to invoke the urgency clause invalid, as the project itself was in the greater interest of the public.

1. - It is alleged that petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 happen to be Khatedar-tenants of the land bearing Khasra Nos. 67 and 68 measuring 2.23 hectares, situated in village Sitapur, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur. It is alleged that petitioner No. 2 has 3/4th share while petitioner No.3 has 1/4 share in the land measuring 8 Bighas 17 Biswas in the disputed khasras. The said lands have been mutated on 19.4.89 in their names vide Annex-1, which was purchased by petitioner No. 1, a registered society under an agreement Annex-2 dated 24.8.90 for residential scheme and possession of the disputed land has been taken over by petitioner No. 1. Thereafter, the petitioner society has spent considerable amount in developing the land in question. The respondent No. 1 had issued a notification vide Annexure-4 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter to be referred as `the Act') on 2.8.91 notifying that the land detailed therein is required for public interest for the use of Bharat Petroleum Limited, Jaipur for constructing its godowns. It was also mentioned in the notification that due to urgency, provisions of Section 5-A of the Act will not be applicable. On 29.11.91 a notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued vide Annex-5 stating that in view of the urgency involved in the matter direction was required to be issued under Section 17-A of the Act and that after 15 days of the date of notification the possession of the land may be taken. Thereafter, the award Annex-7 was passed on 23.3.92 by the Land Acquisition Officer.

2. Reply to show cause notice alongwith preliminary objections has been filed by the respondents. A rejoinder was also filed.

3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that though the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are khatedar-tenants of the land in question but their names have not appeared in the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to them and have prayed that notifications dated 2.8.91 and 29.11.91 and the Award dated 23.3.92 be quashed and set aside in respect of the land in question. It has also been stated that proceedings started on 6.6.89 by appraising the Collector, Jaipur of the need of land, but the notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued only on 2.8.91 and notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 29.11.91 and thus the delay of about 2 years itself shows that there was no urgency and as such dispensing of an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act is bad. It has further been alleged that the entire acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed and set aside for want of issuance of notice under Section 9 of the act, and the award has been passed without previous approval of the State Govt. He has also relied on the judgment in the matter of Smt. Geeta Devi Ghatiwala & 5 Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in 1993(1) WLC (Raj.) 466 , State of T.N. and Another v. Mahalakshmi Animal and Ors., reported in (1996) 7 SCC 269 , Balmokand Khatri Edn. & Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab; reported in (1996) 4 SCC, 212 and in the matter of State of U.P. & Ors v. Rajiv Gupta & Anr., reported in 1994(5) SCC, page 686.

4. A preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Kasliwal appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 alleging inter-alia that petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 have no locus standi to file the writ petition as according to their own averments they have sold their land to petitioner No. 1 under an agreement of sale and thus they have no right to question and file this writ petition after considerable delay. On merits, it is argued that the notifications are perfect, justified, the award has been, passed by the competent authority which is within the jurisdiction and there is no error, irregularity or infirmity in the impugned orders.

5. Mr. Jinesh Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3, while adopting the arguments of Mr. Kasliwal, submits that once the suit file