The severity of sexual offences against minors and the amendment in Section 376 IPC indicating the need for severe punishment.

1. - This is an appeal against the judgment of Additional Sessions Judge, Sikar, convicting the accused-appellant Mahaveer Singh under section 376 IPC and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo further one years rigorous imprisonment.

2. The allegation against the appellant is that he met the prosecutrix Smt. Narbada aged 7 years, when she was returning from her school while going to her house, and took her in a lonely place and committed sexual intercourse, as a result of which, she started bleeding. A report with regard to this incident was lodged at Police Station, Sikar, on the basis of which, the police registered a case under section 376 IPC.

3. After the investigation, the police submitted challan before the learned Judicial Magistrate, who committed the case to the court of Sessions. Learned Aadl. Sessions Judge, after trial convicted and sentenced the accused appellant as aforesaid. Hence this appeal.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant has very vehemently argued that conviction of the appellant can not be maintained as the learned trial court has placed reliance on the testimony of a child witness PW 8 Mst. Narbada who was only seven years old and to whom oath was not administered. He was further submitted that Dr Sushila Mathur who had examined the prosecutrix has not been examined and the learned trial court has placed reliance on the evidence of PW 6 Dr. M.M. Mishra. First Information Report in the case was lodged at the police station after great delay which has not been explained by the prosecution, and that accused has been falsely implicated in such a henious offence. Otherwise also, the prosecution has failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. He has further submitted that even if the charge is held to be proved, the sentence awarded to the accused-appellant is excessive and can not be maintained.

5. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt, the accused has committed a heinous offence and that this court should not interfere with the sentence awarded by the trial court.

6. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the whole matter and have also gone through the judgment of the trial court as well as the record of the case.

7. On merits, we are convinced that the learned trial court was right in coming to the conclusion that the prosecution has been able to prove the charge under section 376 IPC against the accused-appellant. We do not find any infirmity in the statement of PW 8 Mst. Narbada, the prosecutrix. She has given a very natural evidence and her statement cannot be discarded merely because she is a child witness. Dr. Sushila Mathur was not a necessary witness. She was not present when Dr. Narbada was examined by Dr M.M. Misra who has been examined as PW 6. So his statement is sufficient. Delay in lodging the FIR in such matter is not fatal and has been explained by the prosecution. The trial Court has discussed the entire prosecution evidence in great detail and since we are in complete agreement with the same, we do not propose to burden this judgment and we confirm the order of conviction passed by the trial court against the appellant.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant cited many authorities with regard to the sentence. We shall like to deal with them.

9. He has submitted that the maximum sentence provided under section 376 IPC was life imprisonment and even then, generally sentence awarded was from 5 years to 7 years and never beyond 7 years. It was only after amendment in 1983 that a minimum sentence of ten years has been provided in certain circumstances. He has brought to our notice Jai Singh v. State, 1973 Cr. LJ 1466 wherein Allahabad High Court while maintaining conviction under section 376 IPC to an elderly person of 55 years for attempting to commit rape on a child of 7 or 8 years, awarded