The main legal point established in the judgment is that invoking section 166 IPC requires a deliberate disobedience of the law with the intention to cause injury, and mere inadvertence does not suffice.

1. - This petition under section 482 Cr. P. C. has arisen in the following circumstances

2. The Non-petitioner Prabhu Singh was in the employment of Hindustan Copper Project, Khetri as an automobiles driver. A departmental inquiry was instituted against him and he was reverted to the post of a helper by way of punishment by an order dated 29th September 1974, made by the petitioner Ramesh Chand Bahri, who was then the Deputy General Manager and therefore, the appropriate Disciplinary Authority.

3. The non-petitioner filed a complaint in the court of the Judicial Magistrate, Khetri, on 15-10-74 against four persons. The learned magistrate took cognizance only against the present petitioner and I need also not go in to the case of remaining accused persons as it is not relevant for the present purpose. The case of the complainant was that in the aforesaid order of punishment, the petitioner Bahri did not mention the name of the appellate authority to which an appeal to that order lay and the time within which such appeal should be submitted. To make a mention of both these facts, was a direction contained in clause 39 (12) of the certified standing orders which have the force of law. Bahri is thus said to have violated a direction of law. It is further alleged that Bahri did so in order that the complainant non-petitioner may not be able to seek legal redress and thus injury and loss be caused to him. All this was done with the motive of harassing the members of the Rashtriya Khetri Tamba Project Mazdoor Sangh, of which the complainant was a member. It was complained that the action of the petitioner Bahri fell, within the mischief of section 166 IPC.

4. The learned magistrate by his order dated 9-7-75 took cognizance under section 166 IPC against the petitioner, who has preferred this petition for quashing of the proceedings pending in the court of the magistrate.

5. I have heard argument and perused the record.

6. Without entering upon any discussion, I proceed upon the assumption that the standing orders certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946, are law within the meaning of section 166 IPC. It is therefore, also assumed that the petitioner has disobeyed the direction of law in as much as he was required to mention in the order of punishment, the authority to which and the time within which an appeal against that order could be preferred but he failed to do so. This omission on his part can also be considered violation of the direction regarding the way in which Bahri was required to conduct himself a public servant. But the provisions of section 166 IPC are attracted only if the alleged offender disobeys a direction of the law knowingly and with the intention to cause or knowing it to be likely that he will by such disobedience, cause injury to the complainant. Mere omission in the order of punishment as to where and within what time, an appeal could lie, appears to me to be a mere act of inadvertence. The certified standing orders are published in a prescribed manner and certainly an active member of a Mazdoor Sangh as the complainant appears to be, must have the knowledge how to proceed in the matter of appeal against the order made against him. An injury has already been inflicted on the complainant and there can possibly be no intention on the part of the petitioner to cause further injury by wilful omission to mention the name of the authority and the time relevant to the possible appeal because in spite of this alleged non-compliance, the complainant could have filed the intended appeal, if any. I therefore feel that to invoke the provisions of section 166 IPC in a case like this, does certainly amount to an abuse of the process of law and the proceedings deserve to be discontinued.

7. Consequently, I accept this petition and direct that the order of the Judicial Magistrate, Khetri, dated 9.7.75 is hereby set aside and the proceedings against the petitioner are quashed.

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