The Board of Revenue has the power to set aside illegal decrees under its supervisory jurisdiction, even in cases where the Collector is not empowered to make a reference under Section 232 or the Board does not have revisional jurisdiction under Section 230.

1. - This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the judgment dated 5-3-1976, by the Board of Revenue (hereinafter referred to as "the Board").

2. The facts relevant for the disposal of this writ petition are that on 10-8-1967, one Radha Kishan filed an application before the Tehsildar, Phalodi, to the effect that in the precints of village Mayakoria, there is Government land khasra No. 33 measuring 358 Bighas and 5 biswa which, since times immemorial is being used as grazing land, but that, Kayamdin, Fateh Khan and Noor Mohammed (petitioners before us) had cultivated that land by illegally taking possession of the same. On the complaint, proceedings under Section 91 of the Land Revenue Act, were commenced, and after enquiry, the Tehsildar, by his order dated 31-3-1970 ordered the ejectment of Kayamdin, Fateh Khan and Noor Mohammed from the land. The ejectment order .was upheld by the Collector, but while an appeal was pending before the Revenue Appellate Authority, the three petitioners filed a suit under Sections 88 and 89 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").in the court of the Assistant Collector, Phalodi, who decreed.the suit on 14-8-1973, declaring the petitioners to be khatedars.of khasra No. 33, area 358 Bighas and 5 Biswas in village Mayakoria, Tehsil Phalodi. Thereupon Radha Kishan lodged a complaint to the Collector, Jodhpur, disclosing the facts about the land being recorded as Gochar land, and the proceedings initiated under Section 91 of the Land Revenue Act. The matter came before the Additional Collector, Jodhpur, who, on examination of the record found the complaint to be true It also came to his notice that the fact .about the proceedings under section 91 of the Land Revenue Act, were concealed in the plaint and the Tehsildar, in his written statement also did not bring this fact to the notice of the court and gave a vague reply, and did not deny the facts and allegations of the plaint. The Additional Collector, having come to the .conclusion that the suit had been decreed through collusion made a reference to the Board of Revenue for setting aside the decree passed-by the Assistant Collector, Phalodi, dated 14-8-1973. The reference was accepted by the Board of Revenue by the impugned order, and the decree of the Assistant Collector dated 14-8-1973 was set aside.

3. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that section 232 of the Act empowers the Collector to make reference only in matters of legality and propriety of an order passed by the Revenue Courts, subordinate to him, and the irregularity of any proceedings Therein. It has been strenuously contended by the learned counsel that in the present case, the Assistant Collector had passed a decree in favour of the petitioners, and it was not within the powers of the Collector to make a reference for getting that decree set aside. Assailing the order of the Board, it has been stressed that Board has no revisional powers in matters where appeal lies to it. The argument advanced from the opposite sides that the Board has power of general superintendence and control over all the Revenue Courts, and if there is any miscarriage of justice, even the decrees of the subordinate courts can be set aside by the Board.

4. The question about the scope of section 232 of the Act came up for decision before this court in the case of Karan Singh v. State & others 1978 RRD 507 (H.C.) and the intention of the legislature in using the words "decree" and "order" in various Sections of the Act was discussed, and the omission of the word "decree" in Section 232, along with the word "order" was considered very significant, consequently the word "order" occurring in Section 232 was held not to cover "decree" and the Collector was not held competent to make reference for cancelling a decree under Section 232 of the Act, nor the Revenue Board was held competent to cancel the d