A subsequent purchaser of the property in question has a right to be impleaded in the proceedings and to be heard therein.

1. - Today the matter comes upon an application being I.A. No. 5888 of 2013 filed on behalf of the applicant M/s. Royal Palace Mattel, Sirohi through its partner Shri Vikram Singh Rajput under Order 1, Rule 10 C.P.C. for being impleaded as a party respondent in the appeal.

2. It has been claimed in the application that during the pendency of the Us between Nisar Mohd. and Durga Devi, the applicant purchased the land in question through a registered sale deed dated 12.12.2012. It is claimed in the application that the possession of the property in question has also been handed over to the applicant and thus, the applicant is a proper and necessary party in the present appeal, which has been preferred by Nisar Mohd. against the rejection of his application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C.

3. Shri Sandeep Shah learned Counsel for the applicant relies on the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of A. Nawab John and Ors. v. V.N. Subramaniyam reported in (2012) 7 SCC 738 and Thomson Press (India) Limited v. Nanak Builders and Investors Private Limited and Ors. reported in (2013) 5 SCC 397 and submits that the transfer pendente lite is neither illegal nor void-ab-initio and impleadment of the subsequent purchaser of the property is essential for the just decision of the case.

4. Shri Richin Surana learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Venna v. Manik Roy and Ors. reported in AIR 2007 SC 1332 and submits that the transferee, who during the pendency of the litigation knowingly purchased the property from the defendant without leave of the Court cannot claim impleadment in view of the doctrine of lis pendence. Thus, he submits that the application filed under Order 1, Rule 10 C.P.C. praying for impleadment of party should be rejected.

5. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the applicant M/s. Royal Palace Mattel, Sirohi and the learned Counsel for the appellant.

6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the subsequent two decisions of A. Nawab John and Thomson Press (India) Limited (supra), considered in detail the earlier judgments in the cases of Sanjay Verma and Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon reported in (2005) 11 SCC 403 and held as below:

"17. It is settled legal position that the effect of Section 52 is not to render transfers affected during the pendency of a suit by a party to the suit void; but only to render such transfers subservient to the rights of the parties to such suit, as may be, eventually, determined in the suit. In other words, the transfer remains valid subject, of course, to the result of the suit. The pendente lite purchaser would be entitled to or suffer the same legal rights and obligations of his vendor as may be eventually determined by the Court."

"12 The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of .the parties from dealing with the property constituting the subject-matter of the suit. The section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the Court." (Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy, AIR 2007 SC 1332 , para 12)

18. Such being the scope of Section 52, two questions arise: Whether a pendente lite purchaser (1) is entitled to be impleaded as a party to the suit; (2) once impleaded what are the grounds on which he is entitled to contest the suit.

19. This Court on more than one occasion held that when a pendente lite purchaser seeks to implead himself as a party - defendant to the suit, such application should be liberally considered. This Court also held in Smt. Saila Bala Dassi v. Smt. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and another, AIR 1958 SC 394 , that, "justice' requires", a pendente lite purchaser "should be given an opportunity to protect his rights". It was a case, where the property in dispute had been mortgaged b