The court has the power to quash criminal proceedings where the parties have entered into a compromise and the offences are not of a serious nature.

1. - This Criminal Misc. Petition has been preferred by the petitioners with the prayer for quashing the proceeding pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Rawatsar in Criminal Case No. 761/2013 (State of Rajasthan v. Kalawati & Ors.) for the offence punishable under Sections 467, 468,471 and 120-B I.P.C.

2. Brief facts of the case are that on a written complaint filed at the instance of respondent No. 2 before the Judicial Magistrate, Rawatsar, the Police Station, Sawatsar registered an F.I.R. No. 303/2012 against the petitioner. After investigation, the police filed charge sheet against the petitioner for offence junishable under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B I.P.C. in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Rawatsar wherein the trial is pending against the petitioner for the aforesaid offence.

3. During the pendency of the trial, an application was preferred on behalf of the petitioner as well as the respondent No. 2 while stating that both the parties have entered into compromise and, therefore, the proceedings pending against the petitioner may be terminated. The learned Trial Court vide order dated 29.3.2014 allowed the parties to compound the offence punishable under Section 420 I.P.C. however, rejected the application so far it relates to compounding the offence punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B I.P.C.

4. The present Criminal Misc. Petition has been preferred by the petitioner for quashing the said proceedings against them.

5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the complainant-respondent No. 2 and the petitioner have already entered into compromise and on the basis of it, the petitioners have already been acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 420 I.P.C. therefore, there is no possibility of conviction of the petitioners for the offence punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B I.P.C. It is also argued that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the trial against the petitioner for the offence punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471 and'120-B I.P.C. because the same may derail the compromise arrived at between the parties.

6. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 has admitted that the parties have already entered into compromise and the respondent No. 2 does not want to press the charges levelled against the petitioner in relation to offence punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B I.P.C.

7. The Hon'ble Apex Court while answering a reference in the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in JT 2012(9) SC 426 has held as below; -

"57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus-The power of High Court in quashing criminal proceeding of F.I.R. or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a Criminal Court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.; (i) to secure the ends of justice; or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc.; cannot provide for a