Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to an application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside an award.

1. - The appellant-State of Rajasthan has laid this appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (For short referred to as the Act of 1996) against the impugned order dated 23.5.2013, passed by the learned District Judge, Hanumangarh, whereby the application of the appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was rejected.

2. The appellant preferred an application before the learned District Judge under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside the an arbitral award. The application was submitted after a lapse of six months, and therefore, the appellant State made an endavour for condonation of delay by submitting an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court below after examining Section 34 (3) and the proviso attached with the said sub-section rejected the application by concluding that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable and the Court is not empowered to extend the period of limitation beyond four months.

3. The learned Additional Government Counsel has argued that the provisions of Limitation Act are applicable in arbitral proceedings by virtue of Section 37 of the Act of 1996 and, as such, Section 5 can be applied even for an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.

4. Mr. Purohit has strenuously urged that the learned Court Below has not examined the provisions of Section 34 in right perspective and, as such, rejection of the application for condonation of delay is not sustainable.

5. Per contra, Mr. DLR Vyas has submitted that if the legislature in its wisdom has provided the period of limitation under Sub-Section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for three months and under proviso to Sub-Section (3) of the Section 34 further grace period of 30 days is provided if endavour is made by a party seeking relief under the aforesaid provision, and therefore, beyond four months, condonation of delay is not envisaged under Section 34 for entertaining application. Mr. Vyas has further argued that in an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, provisions contained under Section 5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable. For substantiating this contention learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470. The Apex Court has observed in this behalf in para 14 as infra:-

14. Here the history and scheme of the 1996 Act support the conclusion that the timelimit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an award is absolute and unextendible by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 1995 which preceded the 1996 Act stated as one of its main objectives the need "to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process". This objective has found expression in Section 5 of the Act which prescribes the extent of judicial intervention in no uncertain terms:

6. Mr. Vyas has also placed reliance on three Judges' Bench decision of the Apex Court in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others (2008) 7 SCC 169 wherein the similar issue arose and the Court recorded a finding in clear and unequivocal terms that in relation to proceedings under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the provisions under Section 5 & 14 are not attracted. Para 20 of the verdict reads as under:-

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act inter alia provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period of limitation prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period was the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent, they are not expressly excluded by such