Courts should adopt a liberal approach in interpreting the concept of "sufficient cause" for delay in filing applications under limitation statutes, considering the facts and circumstances of each case and balancing the interests of justice and the rights of the parties involved.

1. - Despite service nobody appeared on behalf respondents to oppose this petition. Bhawani Singh and Ramvati have preferred this writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 23.05.2013 (Annexure-8) passed in Civil Misc. Case No.126/2011 by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dholpur whereby the application filed by the petitioner under Order 22, Rule 3 read with Rule 9 CPC was dismissed.

2. The brief facts of the writ petition are that the respondents filed a suit for permanent injunction and for setting aside the order dated 26th June, 1971 against Shri Bhero (father of the petitioner and proforma-respondent No.10) and his brother Shri Rameshwar (proforma-respondents No.8). In the above suit summons were never served and ex-parte judgment & decree was passed on 1st August, 2011.

3. Mr. Bhero and Mr. Rameshwar, defendants filed an application for setting aside ex-parte judgment and decree under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC on 11.10.2011 along with an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. During pendency of the application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC applicant/defendant Mr. Bhero expired on 25.08.2012 and the legal representatives could not file an application for impleading them as Legal Representatives of the defendant Mr. Bhero in time. On 1.8.2012 petitioners and the proforma-respondent No.10 filed an application under Order 22, Rule 3 read with Rule 9 CPC along with an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for impleading them as legal representatives of deceased applicant/defendant Mr. Bhero with prayer of setting aside the abatement.

4. Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 contested the above application on the ground of delay and after hearing learned trial court dismissed the application vide impugned order dated 23rd May, 2013 (Annexure-8) without considering the Limitation prescribed in Article 121 of Limitation Act 1963.

5. Heard.

6. Learned counsel for petitioners have submitted that petitioners and respondent No. 10 were not aware about pendency of application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC therefore, they could not move an application within prescribed period enshrined in Article 120 of the Limitation Act i.e. 90 days. After receiving information from the counsel they came to know about pendency of application thereafter they immediately moved an application for setting aside abatement and for taking on record the L.Rs of deceased Bhero. Since there is Limitation of 60 days prescribed under Article 121 for setting aside abatement, therefore, the application under Order 22, Rule 9 was well within time which was wrongly considered as time barred by the learned trial court. Learned trial court without considering the facts that pendency of application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC was not in the knowledge of petitioners and proforma-respondent No.10, wrongly rejected the application. Therefore, this writ petition may be allowed and the impugned order may be quashed and application under Order 22, Rule 3 read with Rule 9 CPC may be allowed. Learned counsel relied on the judgment delivered in the case of Mr. Ram Nath SAO @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors. Reported in 2002 WLC (SC) Civil Page 331.

7. In the matter of Ram Nath Sao (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-

"The expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of section 5 of the Act or Order 22, Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not, will be dependent upon facts of each case. There can not be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with th