The repeal of the old Act by the new Act rendered the old Act inapplicable to the suit premises, and therefore the suit was maintainable under the T.P. Act.

1. - The appellant-defendant has filed the present appeal under Section 100 of CPC, challenging the judgment and decree dated 11.03.2011 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Kishangarh, District Ajmer (hereinafter referred to as "the appellate court") in Civil Appeal No.40/2009, whereby the appellate court has partly allowed the said appeal and partly confirmed the judgment and decree dated 07.11.2009 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) Kishangarh, District Ajmer (hereinafter referred to as "the trial court") in Civil Suit No.89/2004.

2. The short facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the respondent-plaintiff had filed the suit against the appellant-defendant seeking possession of the suit premises being the shop No.6 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as "the T.P. Act"). It was alleged interalia in the suit that the appellant-defendant was the tenant in respect of the said suit shop, which was let out to him by late Shri Ganga Bishan, who happened to be the father of the respondent-plaintiff. According to the respondent, he had become the owner of the suit shop after the death of his father, by virtue of the will executed by his father in his favour, however the appellant was not paying rent to him since 01.05.2003. The respondent, therefore, had given a notice dated 19.01.2004 under Section 106 of the T.P. Act terminating the tenancy and calling upon the appellant to hand over the possession of the suit premises. However the said notice was not replied to by the appellant and hence the suit for possession and for recovery of arrears of rent was filed. The said suit was resisted by the appellant by filing the written statement, denying the allegations made in the plaint, and further contending inter-alia that the respondent was not the landlord of the suit shop, and therefore no relationship of the landlord and tenant existed between the respondent and the appellant. According to the appellant, he had taken the suit shop on rent from Shri Raghuveer, another son of late Shri Ganga Bishan, and he was paying rent to the said Raghuveer, and therefore the respondent-plaintiff was not entitled to file the suit.

3. The trial court after appreciating the evidence on record held that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the tenancy was legally terminated by the respondent-plaintiff under Section 106 of the T.P. Act and hence the respondent-plaintiff was entitled to get the decree of possession and the arrears of rent, as prayed for. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the appellant had preferred the appeal before the appellate court. The said appeal came to be partly allowed vide the impugned judgment and decree and hence the present second appeal was filed.

4. Mr. Vishwajeet Mantri, the learned counsel for the appellant, though had raised many contentions in the appeal memo, had confined his submission to the issue of maintainability of the suit in the civil court. According to him, though the Rajasthan Premises ( Control, Rent and Eviction) Act 1950 was repealed as per Section 32 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001, the old Act of 1950 had continued to remain in force in the municipal area of Kishangarh, where the suit premises was situated inasmuch as the municipal area of Kishangarh being not the District Headquarter was not included in the notification dated 01.04.2003 issued under Section 1 (3) of the Act of 2001, and hence the whole Act of 2001 was not made applicable to the said area of Kishangarh, when the suit was filed. Mr. Mantri submitted that the old Act of 1950 being in force, the respondent-plaintiff was required to file the suit under the said Act, and the suit under the T.P. Act was not maintainable. The Court does not find any substance in the said submission as the said controversy has already been settled by this Court in various judgments.