1. - Legal representatives of appellant-defendant have filed this second appeal under Section 100 CPC to challenge the impugned judgment and decree dated 20th of March, 2006 passed by learned Additional District Judge No.2, Jodhpur (for, short, 'learned lower appellate Court), whereby learned lower appellate Court has affirmed the judgment and decree passed by Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) Jodhpur (City), Jodhpur dated 18.03.2002.

2. This appeal is filed after delay of 2344 days, therefore, appellant has also moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. Averments contained in the application reads as under:-

1. That the impugned judgment and decree was passed by learned appellate Court on 20.3.2006.

2. That it is only in the last of year 2010 one of the appellants, namely, Rajveer Singh came to know about the aforesaid proceedings as after dismissal of first appeal defendant-appellant Shri V.S. Mertiya (father of the appellants) died and the appellants were not known to the facts of the litigation. Shri Rajveer Singh collected certified copies of judgments as aforesaid but was not aware of the consequence because the lis was affecting only the appellants Anand Singh and Surendra Singh. Further, when the appellant Surendra Singh came to hear the whispers about the demolition steps to be taken at the instance of plaintiff he collected papers from appellant Rajveer Singh.

3. That because of the eldest brother Anand Singh being in service in Indian Airforce and was posted out of station for all the time and the appellants inter-se could not meet and have a dialogue on the matter.

4. That just before three months Shri Anand Singh has been transferred at Jodhpur and when after meeting the appellants tried to enquire about the matter it came to the knowledge that some part of the construction is going to be demolished, which is done, will deprive the appellants from using their property in question. Thus, without wasting any time contacting the counsel are preferring this second appeal before this Hon'ble Court.

5. That the aforesaid delay caused in filing the aforesaid appeal is un-intentional and without any fault on the part of appellants, thus, they crave liberty to request this Hon'ble Court to condone the delay caused in filing this second appeal.

3. Respondent has contested the application by submitting its reply. In the reply, a specific objection is taken by the respondent that the facts averred in the application seeking condonation of delay are absolutely vague, cryptic and unspecific, therefore, such averments cannot be relied upon. It is also submitted in the reply that even date of death of original defendant, V.S. Mertiya, has not been mentioned in the application. In that background, it is pleaded in the reply that when the original defendant has not filed this appeal in time though he was very much aware about the verdict of the appellate Court no indulgence can be granted to his legal representatives on the strength of certain averments which are not inspiring confidence.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the application.

5. There remains no quarrel that while exercising its judicial power and discretion, Court should adopt a liberal approach in construing word "sufficient cause", but liberal construction of the term does not mean that delay is to be condoned for mere askance and, even in cases where negligence and apathy of the litigant is clearly apparent and writ large. The expression "sufficient cause" is receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice remains unquestionable and the law Courts are construing the same utmost liberally. However, when negligence or inaction on the part of a litigant is clearly visible and there is lack of bona fide on the part of a party delay is not liable to be condoned.

6. It is trite that law of limitation is based on public policy and its precise object is to prevent disturbance o