The deposit under section 119A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, must be made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and non-compliance with the provisions will result in the dismissal of the appeal.

1. - This is an appeal by Shri Kumaranand under section 116A of the Representation of the People Act 1951, hereafter referred to as the Act, against the order of the learned Election Tribunal, Jaipur City, dated the 19th September, 1963. Shri Kumaranand contested the election to the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly from the Beawar Constituency at the last general election held in February, 1962, and came out successfully, defeating his nearest rival, respondent Shri Brij Mohanlal, by a margin of 2,106 votes. Shri Brij Mohanlal challenged the election by means of an election petition, dated April 10, 1962, on several grounds. The learned Tribunal, on a trial of the election petition came to the conclusion that Shri Kumaranand was guilty of committing corrupt practices under section 123(4) of the Act in publishing the poem "Mang Raha Hoon Do Bhai Vote" containing some false statements, of facts relating to the personal character and conduct of the election petitioner which were highly prejudicial to his election prospects. Accordingly the Tribunal declared Shri Kumaranand's election to be void under section 100(1)(b) of the Act and set it aside, making a further direction that he shall pay half the costs of the election petitioner, including Rs. 500 as counsel's fee. It is against that order of the learned Tribunal that Shri Kumaranand has come up in appeal to this Court.

2. Two preliminary objections have been raised against the appeal. Firstly, it has been urged by the respondent that the appeal is barred by time inasmuch as the Tribunal's order in question was passed on September 19, 1963, whereas the appeal was filed on October 21, 1963, beyond the period of 30 days prescribed for its presentation under section 116A(3) of the Act. It has further been pointed out that no court fee was paid by the appellant when he presented the appeal on October 21, 1963 and that the deficiency was made good on October 28, 1963. Thus the first objection of the respondent is that the appeal is barred by time. The second preliminary objection is that the appellant has not fulfilled the requirement of section 119A of the Act inasmuch as the government treasury receipt enclosed by him with the memorandum of his appeal docs not show that a deposit of Rs. 500 had been made by him in favour of the Election Commission as security for the costs of the appeal.

3. We shall deal with both these preliminary objections separately, and shall start with a consideration of the first objection about the presentation of appeal beyond the period of limitation prescribed for it under the law.

4. As has been stated, the learned Tribunal gave its Judgment on September 19, 1963. A copy of it was supplied to the appellant on the very next day. The appellant applied for a copy of the decree on October 1, 1963 and it was granted to him on October 21, 1963. The same day, the appellant filed the appeal in this court, but without the necessary court fee. A copy of the decree was thereafter filed in this Court on October 23, 1963, and the court fee was paid on October 28, 1963. There is no dispute about these basic facts. The controversy is that while the appellant claims that he is entitled to exclude the time spent by him in obtaining a copy of the decree, the respondent contends that this could not be done, for it was not at all necessary for the learned Tribunal to draw up a decree or for the appellant to file its copy with the memorandum of his appeal. Nonetheless, the respondent, who has personally argued his case before us, has conceded that if it could be shown that the appellant was entitled to exclude the period spent by him in obtaining a copy of the decree, both the defects-the one relating to the belated presentation of the appeal and the other about the failure to file the necessary court fee in respect of it-would be amply made good. We shall therefore proceed to consider the question whether the period spent by the appellant in obtaining a copy of the d