Hon'ble BHANDARI, J.—The matter has come up on an application seeking vacation of the interim order dated 2.9.2009.

2. With the consent of learned counsel for parties, matter has been heard finally.

3. A challenge has been made to the order dated 21.7.2009 passed by the Rent Tribunal, Ajmer. Aforesaid order was passed on the application moved by non-petitioner seeking appointment of Commissioner to inspect a portion of the premises alleged to have been rented out. There exist serious controversy as to whether portion of premises was rented out or not. It was at the stage when the matter was to be heard finally, the application was allowed by the Tribunal vide impugned order.

4. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the Rent Tribunal has acted beyond its competence as no power is vested in it for appointment of Commissioner. Reference of Section 21 of the Act of 2001 has been given to show that only limited powers exist with the Rent Tribunal which have been incorporated in sub-section (3) (a) to (h) of Section 21 of the Act. The power to appoint Commissioner does not exist with the Tribunal thus it acted beyond its competence in passing order, hence, it deserves to be set aside.

5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2, on the other hand, submits that provision of Section 21(3) of the Act is wide enough. According to the aforesaid provision, the Tribunal can regulate its own procedure. Since there exists dispute regarding existence of kitchen and as to whether it was rented out or not, appointment of Commissioner and report thereof would enable the Tribunal to dispose of the matter in a proper manner. The word 'regulate' used in Section 21(3) has been given meaning by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “UP Cooperative Cane Unions Federations vs. West U.P. Sugar Mills Association & Ors.” ((2004)5 SCC 430).

6. I have considered submissions made by learned counsel for parties and perused the order impugned herein.

7. The only argument raised by learned counsel for petitioner is in regard to provisions of Section 21(3) of the Act. My attention has been drawn towards sub clause (a) to (h) of sub-section 3 of Section 21 of the Act to show that limited powers vest in the Rent Tribunal pursuant to provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. Power to appoint Commissioner does not vests in the Tribunal. I have perused both Section 21(3) so as the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court (supra).

8. The language of Section 21(3) of the Act is quite clear and gives ample powers to the Tribunal to regulate its own procedure and, for that purpose, it has additionally specified that power as vested in the Civil Court by virtue of provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure can also be exercised by the Tribunal to the extent indicated in sub-clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Act. The aforesaid power does not control or reduce the power otherwise vest in the Rent Tribunal to regulate its own procedure. The word 'regulate' has elaborately discussed and described by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Cooperative Cane Union Federations case (supra).

9. In view of aforesaid, I am of the opinion that Rent Tribunal is having power to regulate its own procedure which includes even appointment of Commissioner. Accordingly, I find no substance in the writ petition. Hence, the same is dismissed. In view of dismissal of the writ petition, application for vacation of interim order also stands disposed of.