Hon'ble Dr. KOTHARI, J.—This second appeal of the appellant-defendant, Mohan Lal S/o Amarchandji Sindhi, who is now represented by his legal representative, Kamlesh S/o Mohan Lal, was filed in this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, way-back on 24.02.1983 and is one of the oldest second appeal pending in this Court, which has the second round of its decision after remand by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while deciding the Civil Appeal No.2277/2011 (SLP (C) No.10096/2006)- Kamlesh vs. Liquidator, Bhopal Cooperative Society Ltd. & others, on 02.03.2011 setting aside the previous decision of this second appeal by the learned Single Judge of this Court on 06.01.2006 dismissing the present second appeal of the defendant-appellant. While dismissing the second appeal of the defendant-appellant on the sole and following substantial question of law, which was framed at the time of admission of the present second appeal on 06.07.1983, which reads as infra: -

“Whether the suit was triable by the civil court?”

2. While dismissing the present second appeal, the learned Single Judge of this Court on 06.01.2006 held that the civil court had the jurisdiction to decide the suit for ejectment filed by the respondent-plaintiff, Liquidator, Bhopal Cooperative Society Ltd. (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'BCSL') and the objection raised by the original defendant, Mohan Lal that only revenue court had jurisdiction to try the present suit since the land in question was agricultural land in view of bar of jurisdiction contained in Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 was negatived in the following terms:

“I considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. It appears that the defendant took the plea because the land has been shown as agricultural land in lease deed Ex.1. In the lease deed Ex.1, word “Industry” used for poultry-farm, sheep-breeding center and dairyfarm but it is clear from the lease deed itself that the lessee was permitted to grow crops like, Jawar, barly, methi, corn, mutter, gram and lahasun etc. but only to feed cattle and birds of his dairy, poultry birds and sheep with specific restriction against use of land for agricultural business. Even if it is ignored that for what purpose the land was given to the plaintiff by the State Government, and even if it is accepted that the land in question is agricultural land even then merely on the basis of this permission to grow crop, the nature of tenancy cannot be considered to mean for agricultural purpose. For deciding nature of tenancy, what is relevant is the nature of tenancy and not the nature of the land. Even if an agricultural land is let out for any non-agricultural purpose and it is not permissible in the law governing agricultural tenancy, then consequence may follow and action may be taken against the lessor katedar tenant of the agricultural land as provided under the relevant Act but it will not change the nature of the tenancy. Therefore, crucial issue was whether the premises was let out for agriculture purpose or it was let out for any other purpose. Second question would be, if it was out for any purpose other than agriculture purpose then whether it was let out for industrial purpose because there is a reference of “industry” in the lease-deed Ex.1.

Because of the use of the words “agricultural” and “industry” in the lease-deed and because of permission to grow certain crops in terms of the lease-deed, it is sought to be advanced that the lease is for agriculture purpose. To examine this aspect of the matter, it will be necessary to find out the real intention of the parties in letting out the land in question to the defendant. The intention has been made clear in the lease-deed itself, which says as under: -

“The lessor hereby demises to the lessee for the purpose of starting poultry, sheep breeding and dairy Farms on the plot of 30 bighas of agricultural land...”

Therefore, the land was let out for establishing poult

Click Here to Read the rest of this document