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2014 Supreme(Raj) 406

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR.
VINEET KOTHARI, J.
Managing Committee, Bhartiya Shiksha Prachar Samiti, Udaipur & Anr. – Appellant
Vs.
Bhoopal Singh Babel & Ors. (Along-with identical 12 writ petitions, mentioned in the Schedule) – Respondent
S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6613/2014
Decided on: 26th September, 2014

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared
Mr. B.L. Tiwari, for the petitioners.

The Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the disputes relating to service matters of the employees governed by the Rajasthan Non-Government Education Institutions Act, 1989.

Headnote:

RAJASTHAN NON-GOVERNMENT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ACT, 1989 - SECTION 21 - JURISDICTION OF TRIBUNAL - CONDITIONS OF SERVICE - GRATUITY AND LEAVE ENCASHMENT - REMEDY BEFORE DISTRICT EDUCATION OFFICER - RULE 64 OF RULES OF 1993 - LACK OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES - EQUITY IN FAVOR OF EMPLOYEES - WRIT PETITION DISMISSED.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners, Managing Committee of Bhartiya Shiksha Prachar Samiti, Udaipur and Managing Committee, Vidhya Niketan Secondary School & Vidhya Niketan Senior Secondary School, Udaipur, challenged the order of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal, Jaipur, allowing applications filed by respondents/employees for payment of gratuity and leave encashment. The petitioners contended that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to decide the applications and that the employees should have approached the District Education Officer under Rule 36 of the Rules of 1993.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the disputes relating to service matters of the employees governed by the Rajasthan Non-Government Education Institutions Act, 1989. The Court also held that Rule 64 of the Rules of 1993, which seeks to avoid direct litigation before the Court of law at the instance of the employees, is directory in nature and not mandatory. Therefore, the employees were not barred from approaching the Tribunal directly.

Issues: 1. Whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the applications filed by the employees for payment of gratuity and leave encashment. 2. Whether the employees should have approached the District Education Officer under Rule 36 of the Rules of 1993.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the disputes relating to service matters of the employees governed by the Rajasthan Non-Government Education Institutions Act, 1989. 2. Rule 64 of the Rules of 1993, which seeks to avoid direct litigation before the Court of law at the instance of the employees, is directory in nature and not mandatory. Therefore, the employees were not barred from approaching the Tribunal directly.

Final Decision: The Court dismissed the writ petitions filed by the petitioners.

ORDER

BY THE COURT:

1. These writ petitions have been filed by the Managing Committee of the Bhartiya Shiksha Prachar Samiti, Udaipur and Managing Committee, Vidhya Niketan Secondary School & Vidhya Niketan Senior Secondary School, Udaipur being aggrieved by the order passed by the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal, Jaipur, (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'Tribunal') on 11.04.2014 allowing 13 applications filed by the respondents/employees, who were working as teachers and in other capacities in the petitioner Institutions prior to their retirement and they approached the said Tribunal for relief from the petitioners for payment of their gratuity and leave encashment etc. The applications filed under Section 21 of the Act of 1989 were allowed by the learned Tribunal while holding that the petitioner Institution was under an obligation to pay the amount of leave encashment and gratuity to the respondents/employees of the petitioner Institution.

2. Mr. B.L. Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the said Tribunal constituted under Section 22 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989 (Act of 1989) whose jurisdiction by way of application is defined u/s 21 and by way of appeals u/s 22 of the said Act, did not have any jurisdiction to decide the said applications filed by the respondents/employees and since this question of lack of Tribunal's jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter, he submitted that this question can be raised even for the first time before this Court in the present writ petitions, even though the said question admittedly was not raised before the Tribunal itself while opposing the applications filed u/s 19 of the Act of 1989 by the respondents.

3. For this purpose, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Singh & Ors. Vs. Chaman Paswan & Ors. reported in AIR 1954 SC 340 particularly para 6, which will be discussed herein after. The two important submissions, which the learned counsel for the petitioner raised are that the liability to pay the gratuity and leave encashment amount to the respondents/employees is not dispute but the same was to be paid out of the grant-in-aid to be received from the State Government, which for some time, the petitioner Institution is not receiving since 2011. Secondly, the learned counsel for the petitioner fairly submitted that this question was not raised before the Tribunal, however, in view of remedy provided under the said Act of 1989, read with Rules of 1993 framed under the said Act, the remedy by way of recovery of due amount was available to the non-petitioners/employees was by way of approach before the District Education Officer with further appellate remedy before the Director of the Education Department under Rule 36 of the Rules of 1993 and not by way of original jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Act of 1989 before the Tribunal, and therefore, the impugned order of Tribunal deserves to be quashed by this Court.

4. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length and upon perusal of the relevant provisions and the judgment cited at Bar, this Court is not inclined to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the present case and the writ petitions deserve dismissal. The reasons are as follows.

5. Firstly, there was no good reason or explanation from the side of the petitioner Institution for not raising the said question of jurisdiction, which according to petitioner goes to the root of the matter, before the Tribunal itself. It is beyond the pale of doubt that the question of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter but then it has to be raised in the first available instance to the objector. The Tribunal or the authority, whose lack of jurisdiction is sought to be contended, should be first made aware of such lack of jurisdiction and not for the first time befo






































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