Hon'ble LOHRA, J.—Appellants have laid this appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'CPC') against the impugned order dated 29th of January, 2015 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Hanumangarh (for short, 'learned Tribunal'), whereby the learned Tribunal has dismissed the application of the appellants under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC for setting aside award dated 21st of August 2002.

2. In the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, it is, inter-alia, averred by the appellants that brother-in-law of first respondent lodged a false FIR against appellant No.1 at Police Station Pilibanga for offences under Sections 279 and 304A IPC, in which after investigation police filed charge-sheet before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pilibanga. It is further stated in the application that on the basis of false FIR, respondents also filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the appellants and after receipt of notices of the claim petition, appellants handed over papers to their counsel who was representing the first appellant in criminal case, and he assured them to contest the claim case also on their behalf. It is further alleged in the application that the advocate assured the appellants that as and when their presence would be required in the claim case, requisite information would be divulged to them by him. Ultimately, the criminal case is decided on 3rd of March, 1998 and the first appellant is acquitted for the offences under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC. As per the version of the appellants in the application, the counsel informed that acquittal in criminal case would facilitate disposal of the claim petition also in their favour and henceforth they are not required to attend the proceedings in the claim case before the learned Tribunal. In sum and substance, for ex-parte award dated 21st October, 2002, appellants have blamed the advocate, who was entrusted brief on their behalf. Along with the application for setting aside ex-parte award, a separate application is also filed for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act with the same facts.

3. The respondents contested both the applications by filing separate replies to both of them. In the return, respondents repudiated the theory of callousness and negligence attributed to the counsel by the appellants. Respondents have also pleaded in the reply that application is designed just to thwart or prolong the execution proceedings. While joining issue with the appellants on their application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, respondents have pleaded that the so-called cause assigned for condonation of delay is false and concocted. Making serious objection against the inordinate delay of more than 12 years, the respondents specifically averred in the reply that on the face of it, it is unbelievable that a litigant would not contact his lawyer for more than a decade after entrusting brief. With these averments, respondents prayed for rejection of the application for condonation of delay and consequential rejection of application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC.

4. The learned Tribunal, after hearing the rival submissions, by the impugned order, rejected both the applications precisely for the reason that appellants have miserably failed to make out a case for condonation of delay for more than 12 years. The learned Tribunal has found that appellants have not been able to make out a case for condonation of delay inasmuch as the cause is neither good, nor sufficient within the four corners of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. While declining prayer of the appellants for condonation of delay, the learned Court below has also rejected the application for setting aside ex-parte award.

5. Mr. Rakesh Matoria, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that appellants have laid application for setting aside ex-parte award immediately on receipt of notice for execution proceedings,

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