Nirmaljit Kaur, J.

1. As per the advertisement dated 02.08.2013 an applicant should submit the proof of passing the requisite education qualification before the written examination held by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. The petitioner was pursuing the B.Ed. Examination at the time of filing the application form. The first examination for the post of School Lecturer (Commerce) was held on 12.07.2014. The last examination for the said recruitment examination was held on 27.09.2014. The result of the B.Ed examination was declared on 25.09.2014 and the petitioner submitted her certificate of B.Ed examination on 25.09.2014 i.e. before the last date of the recruitment examination. The result of the petitioner was declared and she was found in merit. However, the appointment order was not issued to her on account of the fact that she did not have the requisite qualification on the date of the examination when the examination for the post of School Lecturer (Commerce) commenced. It is contended that the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the ratio of the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Smt. Manju Chhaba vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 34/2015) decided on 10.09.2015 and said judgment has also been upheld by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer vs. Smt. Manju Chhaba and Others (D.B. Civil Special Appeal (W) No. 127/2016) decided on 04.04.2016.

2. Learned counsel for the respondents, although does not dispute that the matte is covered but opposed the same by submitting that the petitioner has filed the present writ petition almost after two years as the result was declared on 27.03.2015 and even the revised list was declared on 10.07.2015. The petitioner was informed on an application moved by her under the Right to Information Act on 29.07.2015 that her candidature was rejected on the ground of not having requisite qualification as on the date of the examination. It is further stated by the learned counsel for the respondents that the vacancies for the subsequent year have also been advertised meanwhile.

3. Heard.

4. It is not disputed that the case of the petitioner is covered by the ratio of the said judgment in the case of Manju Chaba (supra) but still the petitioner cannot be granted the same relief in view of the delay and latches in the facts of the present case. As per the reply, the petitioner was informed about the cancellation of her candidature on 29.07.2015. She did not approach the Court till 25.05.2016 and that too only after the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Manju Chaba (supra). Thus, the petitioner cannot seek the same treatment as Manju Chaba (supra) as she had come well in time and the protection by way of interim relief was also granted to her. However, the petitioner has come after almost 10 months of the order rejecting his candidature and nor any interim order was passed in her favour. Meanwhile, the selection has been finalized.

5. The Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others (Civil Appeal No. 9849 of 2014) decided on 17.10.2014 while dealing with the question of delay and latches held that in such like cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent specially when the claimants lost time and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions by holding that:-

"(23) The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under:

(1) Normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more em