Sabina, J.

Vide this order above mentioned criminal appeal as well as leave to appeal filed by the State would be disposed of.

2. Respondent had faced trial in FIR No. 153/12, registered at Police Station Mandhan, District Alwar for offences under Sections 341, 323, & 307 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 & Section 5/27, 30 of Arms Act, 1959. Trial Court vide order dated 5.3.2016 ordered the acquittal of the respondent Rajaram from the charges framed against him. Hence, the present appeal by the complainant and the application for leave to appeal by the State.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, learned State Counsel and learned counsel for respondent Rajaram and have gone through the record available on the file carefully.

4. Prosecution story in brief is that on 30.11.2012 respondent Rajaram had fired at Udai Singh, son of the complainant. As a result Udai Singh had suffered an injury in his backbone.

5. In the present case charge was framed against the respondent Rajaram under Sections 341, 323, 307 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 5/27 & 30 of the Arms Act, 1959.

6. Trial Court rightly ordered the acquittal of the respondent Rajaram qua offence under the Arms Act as no sanction for prosecution of the respondent was obtained from the competent authority.

7. In the present case, although, the case of the prosecution was that the appellant had fired at the injured Udai Singh but there was no report of the expert to the effect that the alleged weapon carried by the respondent Rajaram was in a working condition and had been actually used at the time of occurrence. It has been noticed by the Trial Court that the injured and the respondent Rajaram were not known to each other and the respondent could not be attributed any motive to have fired at the injured with an intention to kill him.

8. In the facts and circumstances of the present case the learned Trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to establish that the respondent Rajaram had fired from his weapon at the injured Udai Singh.

9. The reasons given by the trial court while ordering the acquittal of the respondent are sound reasons and call for no interference.

10. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, 2002(1) WLC (SC) Cri. 693, has held that where, in a case, two views are possible, the one which favours the accused, has to be adopted by the Court.

11. Similarly, in Mrinal Das & Others v. The State of Tripura, 2011(2) WLC (SC) Cri. 556 : 2011 (9) Supreme Court Cases 479, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after looking into various judgments, has laid down parameters, in which interference can be made in a judgment of acquittal, by observing as under:

"(8) It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact, is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to be person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its own conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial court with respect to both facts