P.K. Lohra, J.

Appellant-Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. has preferred this appeal, under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'Act'), to assail impugned judgment and award dated 06.12.2000 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (First), Jodhpur (for short, 'learned Tribunal') in Claim Case No.55/95(886/95).

2. The grievance of the appellant is limited to the extent learned Tribunal has directed it to pay the amount of compensation and then recover the same from the insured.

3. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that once Tribunal has recorded its finding that insured has violated the terms of the insurance and exonerated insurer from the liability, learned Tribunal ought not to have directed the appellant to pay amount of compensation and then recover the same from insured. In support of his argument, learned counsel has placed reliance on a very vital fact that in view of conflicting decisions of Supreme Court, the matter has been referred to larger Bench and reference is still pending.

4. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced at Bar and perused the impugned judgment and award as well as entire record of the case.

5. There remains no quarrel that appeal of the appellant-Insurer is limited to the extent of challenging the direction issued by the learned Tribunal to pay the amount of compensation and then recover the same from insured, therefore, the said grievance is required to be examined in the backdrop of law of precedents. While it is true that reference on the issue is pending consideration before the Larger Bench of Supreme Court but then mere pendency of reference itself cannot obliterate the judgment, which is holding the field, and merely on the strength of pendency of reference direction issued by the learned Tribunal cannot be faulted. Supreme Court, in case of Saju P. Paul v. National Insurance Co., 2012 ACJ 1852, has examined this issue and held:

"26. The pendency of consideration of the above questions by a larger Bench does not mean that the course that was followed in Baljit Kaur and Challa Upendra Rao should not be followed, more so in a peculiar fact situation of this case. In the present case, the accident occurred in 1993. At that time, the claimant was 28 years old. He is now about 48 years. The claimant was a driver on heavy vehicle and due to the accident he has been rendered permanently disabled. He has not been able to get compensation so far due to the stay order passed by this Court. He cannot be compelled to struggle further for recovery of the amount. The Insurance Company has already deposited the entire awarded amount pursuant to the order of this Court passed on 01-8-2011 [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Saju P. Paul] and the said amount has been invested in a fixed deposit account. Having regard to these peculiar facts of the case in hand, we are satisfied that the claimant (Respondent 1) may be allowed to withdraw the amount deposited by the Insurance Company before this Court along with accrued interest. The Insurance Company (the appellant) thereafter may recover the amount so paid from the owner (Respondent 2 herein). The recovery of the amount by the Insurance Company from the owner shall be made by following the procedure as laid down by this Court in Challa Upendra Rao."

6. The same view is further reiterated by Supreme Court in a later judgment in the case of Manuara Khatun and Others v. Rajesh Kumar Singh and Others, (2017) 4 SCC 796 wherein Court held:-

"19. We find no merit in any of the submissions. Firstly, as mentioned above, we find marked similarity in the facts of this case and the one involved in Saju P. Paul case. Secondly, merely because the compensation has not yet been paid to the claimants though the case is quite old (16 years) like the one in Saju P. Paul case, it cannot be a ground to deny the claimants the relief claimed in these appeals. Thirdly, this Court has already considered and rejected the arg