The central legal point established in the judgment is that the court's discretion to extend the benefit of probation to an accused person is limited, and the nature of the offence and the conduct of the accused are crucial factors in making such a determination.

P.K. Lohra, J.

Appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 11 of the Probation of Offenders, Act 1958 (for short, 'Act') read with Section 372 Cr.P.C to assail impugned judgment dated 7th of June, 2017, rendered by Additional Sessions Judge No.4, Jodhpur Metropolitan (for short, 'learned appellate Court'), whereby learned appellate Court, while partly accepting the appeal of accused-respondent, has extended benefit of probation to her under Section 4 of the Act of 1958 in a complaint case for offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

2. At the threshold, a complaint was laid by appellant against respondent before learned Metropolitan Magistrate No.6, Jodhpur Metro, under Section 138 of the Act and, after completion of trial, learned trial Court convicted the respondent for aforesaid offence and handed down sentence of one year's simple imprisonment with fine of Rs.80, 000/-. Being aggrieved by the same, the accused-respondent preferred an appeal before learned appellate Court and the learned appellate Court, after examining the true purport of offence under Section 138 of the Act, which is compensatory in nature, rather than penal and the fact that she has deposited the requisite amount, maintained her conviction but extended her the benefit of probation by resorting to Section 4 of the Act of 1958.

3. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant, perused the impugned judgment and order and also made endeavour to examine the true purport of Section 138 of the Act.

4. There remains no quarrel that power of the Court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct depends on circumstances of the case but then while exercising such power, the Court is required to see conduct of an individual and the nature of delinquency. It is not in dispute that once a discretion is exercised by the Court to extend benefit of probation to an accused person, power of the appellate Court to interfere with the discretionary order of the Court is very much limited and the said power is not unfettered.

5. Learned appellate Court while exercising its discretion and extending benefit of probation to the respondent has not only considered the nature of offence but also a very vital fact that accused is a lady and there is nothing adverse about her conduct.

6. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, there is no manifest error in the impugned judgment passed by the learned appellate Court requiring interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act.

7. Consequently, appeal fails and same is, hereby, nixed.