2019 Supreme(Raj) 252
IN THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR BENCH
ALOK SHARMA, GOVERDHAN BARDHAR, JJ.
Ajay Rinwa - Appellants
Vs.
The State of Rajasthan and Ors. - Respondent
D.B. Habeas Corpus Petition No. 220 of 2018
Decided On : 08-05-2019
Important Points
Subject
Criminal Law - PREVENTIVE DETENTION
Act Referred
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE : S.161
RAJASTHAN PREVENTION OF ANTI SOCIAL ACTIVITIES ACT : S.2(c), S.3(1), S.3(3), S.2(1), S.3(4), S.11, S.14
Headnote
PREVENTIVE DETENTION - RAJASTHAN PREVENTION OF ANTI-SOCIAL ACTIVITIES ACT, 2006 - SECTION 2(C), 3(1), 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 11, 14 - HABEAS CORPUS - DETENTION ORDER QUASHED - CONSIDERATION OF MATERIAL IN SUBSEQUENT DETENTION ORDER, WHICH WERE CONSIDERED IN THE EARLIER DETENTION ORDER, NULLIFIES THE ENTIRE SUBSEQUENT ORDER OF DETENTION.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner was detained under the Rajasthan Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 2006 (the Act of 2006) on the ground that he was a "dangerous person" within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act. The detention order was based on 19 criminal cases against the petitioner, 16 of which were the same cases that were considered in an earlier detention order that was quashed by the court. The petitioner challenged the detention order on several grounds, including that the consideration of the same material in the subsequent detention order was illegal.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the consideration of the same material in the subsequent detention order, which were considered in the earlier detention order, nullifies the entire subsequent order of detention. The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Chhagan Bhagwan Kahar Vs. N.L. Kalna, where it was held that "even if the order of detention comes to an end either by revocation or by expiry of the period of detention there must be fresh facts for passing a subsequent order."
Issues: 1. Whether the consideration of the same material in the subsequent detention order, which were considered in the earlier detention order, is illegal? 2. Whether the detention order is sustainable in the eyes of law?
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the consideration of the same material in the subsequent detention order, which were considered in the earlier detention order, nullifies the entire subsequent order of detention. The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Chhagan Bhagwan Kahar Vs. N.L. Kalna, where it was held that "even if the order of detention comes to an end either by revocation or by expiry of the period of detention there must be fresh facts for passing a subsequent order."
Final Decision: The court quashed the detention order and directed the petitioner to be set at liberty forthwith.
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : S.S. Hora
For the Respondents: Rekha Madnani
1. Instant Habeas Corpus petition has been filed assailing the order dated 30-6-2018 passed by the District Magistrate Sikar under the Rajasthan Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 2006 (hereafter “the Act of 2006) whereby direction was issued to detain the petitioner-detenue.
2. The preventive detention was based on a report sent by the Superintendent of Police, Sikar on 29th June, 2018 wherein the petitioner was classified as a “dangerous person” within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act of 2006. In the report, the Superintendent of Police observed that the detenue namely, Ajay Rinwa was involved in anti-social activities which being prejudicial to maintenance of public order, necessitated an order that he be detained. The District Magistrate taking note of the aforesaid found himself satisfied that Ajay Rinwa was a “dangerous person” as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act of 2006 and based on such satisfaction passed the order under Section 3(1) of the Act of 2006. The said order was approved by the State Government under Section 3(3) of the Act of 2006 and thereafter an opinion positive to the detention given by the Advisory Board, the order of detention was thus confirmed by the respondent State for a period of one year from the date of detention order i.e. 30th June, 2018.
3. The petitioner-detenue has challenged the said detention order on manifold grounds.
4. Mr. S.S. Hora, counsel for the petitioner submitted that earlier too the petitioner had been served with an order of preventive detention on 14th June, 2016 passed by the District Magistrate, Sikar under Section 3(2) of the Act of 2006. The said order was run through the requisite statutory procedure and confirmed by the State Government. But it was set aside by the Division Bench of this court in DB Habeas Corpus Petition No. 143/2016 Ajay Rinwa Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., vide judgment dated 19th September, 2016.
5. Mr. S.S. Hora submitted that the earlier detention order dated 14-6-2016 which was quashed had detailed sixteen criminal cases against the detenue between the period 2003 and 13-6-2016. The impugned detention order dated 30-6-2018 is yet again founded inter alia on the same sixteen criminal case and additionally three others. And thus albeit the impugned detention order also incorporates three additional cases for the purported subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and confirmation by the State Government following the Advisory Board having found “sufficient reasons, inclusion of material earlier informing the detention order dated 14-6-2016 while passing the subsequent impugned detention order dated 30-6-2018 vitiates, rendering it liable to be quashed only on this ground alone. In support of his submission, Mr. S.S. Hora relied on the case of Chhagan Bhagwan Kahar Vs. N.L. Kalna (1989) 2 SCC 318. In Para 12 of the said judgment, the Apex Court observed as under :
“12. It emerges from the above authoritative judicial pronouncements that even if the order of detention comes to an end either by revocation or by expiry of the period of detention there must be fresh facts for passing a subsequent order. A fortiori when a detention order is quashed by the court issuing a high prerogative writ like habeas corpus or certiorari the grounds of the said order should not be taken into consideration either as a whole or in part even along with the fresh grounds of detention for drawing the requisite subjective satisfaction to pass a fresh order because once the court strikes down an earlier order by issuing rule it nullifies the entire order.”
6. Mr. S.S. Hora submitted that it is thus the law of the land that where an earlier detention order has run its course either by revocation, lapse of the detention period, or has been otherwise quashed by the Courts, the material which led to its passing cannot at all be reckoned for again in the subsequent order of detention and only fresh facts, independent of facts at the foundation of the