The court has the discretion to condone delay in filing an appeal and may consider the totality of circumstances, including the nature of employment and the delay in raising the industrial dispute, in determining the appropriate relief.

JUDGMENT :

1. This appeal is directed against judgment dated 17.12.2013 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court by which writ petition filed by the appellants was dismissed as also subsequent order dated 09.10.2017 passed by the learned Single by which review petition filed by the appellants seeking review of the aforesaid judgment has been dismissed.

2. Appeal is barred by 1482 days. Application No. 542/2018 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed seeking condonation of delay in filing of the appeal. In the application, it has been stated that after the judgment was delivered by learned Single Judge of this Court, dismissing writ petition, the appellants filed review petition. Review petition remain pending for quite some time and was finally dismissed vide order dated 09.10.2017. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the appellants are staying in rural area and he sent a communication to them about dismissal of review petition. They received the communication late and when they contacted him, the appeal was drafted and filed before this Court.

3. Substantial part of the delay has been explained by the reason of pendency of review petition and thereafter delay of few days has been explained by stating that the appellants could not be contacted immediately and when the communication sent by the learned counsel for the appellants reached to them, they contacted him and appeal was drafted and filed. Even though, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondent-State opposed the appeal, but we deem it appropriate to decide this matter on merits rather than on the ground of delay and are inclined to condone the delay in filing of the appeal and the same is accordingly condoned. Application under Section 5 of the Limitation stands allowed.

4. Heard learned counsel for the parties on merits.

5. Mr. Dharmendra Jain, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the appellants worked with the respondents for 3= years. They were initially engaged in January, 1985 on muster toll @ Rs. 11/- per day and thereafter their services were orally terminated on 16.06.1988. Industrial dispute was raised vide notification dated 06.11.1999. Learned Labour Court No. 2, Rajasthan, Jaipur (for short 'the Labour Court') vide award dated 18.08.2010 held termination of the appellants to be violative of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act'). Learned counsel relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jayantibhai Raojibhai Patel Vs. Municipal Council, Narkhed & Others (Civil Appeal No. 6188/2019 decided on 21.08.2019) argued that the Supreme Court in that case revisited its many previous decisions especially Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC 324 and held that in the case of illegal termination of services, reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages is the normal course and therefore in the present case, learned Labour Court as also learned Single Judge ought to have reinstated the appellants with continuity of service and full back wages.

6. Ms. Sheetal Mirdha, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondents opposed the appeal and submitted that learned Single Judge in its order dated 09.10.2017 while dismissing the review petition though took note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra) but declined to go into that aspect as the argument with reference to the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court was not raised when the main writ petition was decided. Learned Additional Advocate General argued that there was enormous delay of more than 10 years in making reference of the dispute to the Labour Court inasmuch as the appellants were engaged on muster roll basis in famine work and it was not a regular employment. They were continued till such time their services were required.

7. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants as also learned Addi