The appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the trial court in granting or refusing temporary injunction unless the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or perversely, or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions.

JUDGMENT

1. Appellant-plaintiff has preferred this appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) read with Section 104 CPC to challenge order dated 11.07.2018 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 2, Barmer (for short, learned trial Court). By the order impugned, learned trial Court has dismissed application of the appellant- plaintiff under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC for grant of temporary injunction in a suit for specific performance of contract.

2. I have heard learned counsel for the respondents and perused the impugned order and other materials available on record.

3. Upon perusal of the impugned order, it is crystal clear that learned trial Court has made sincere endeavour to examine prima facie case in favour of appellant and ultimately recorded a negative finding. Likewise, learned trial Court has also recorded finding on two other necessary ingredients for grant of injunction against the appellant.

4. Law is trite that grant or refusal of temporary injunction is within sole discretion of the Court of first instance and normally appellate Courts are not expected to interfere with the discretionary order of trial Court. The appellate Court can only interfere with if it is found that the order is perverse or passed dehors the province of law governing grant or refusal of temporary injunction. Reliance in this behalf can be profitably made to a celebrated decision of this Court in Smt. Vimla Devi v. Jang Bahadur [AIR 1977 (Raj.) 196] , wherein Court has held :

"I have given my earnest consideration to the contentions raised on behalf of the defendant- petitioner. The order refusing temporary injunction is of a discretionary character. Ordinarily Court of appeal will not interfere with the exercise of discretion passed by the trial Court and substitute for it its own discretion. The interference with the discretionary order, however, may be justified if the lower Court acts arbitrarily or perversely, capriciously or in disregard of sound legal principles or without considering all the relevant records.

In the light of the above observations, I have now to see whether it was open to the learned District Judge to interfere with the order of the learned trial Court. It is well settled that the grant of temporary injunction is a discretionary order and the decision of the first Court could not be easily interfered with by the appellate Court vide Musa v. Badri Prasad, ILR (1953) 3 Raj 257. The mere possibility of the appellate Court coming to a different conclusion on the same facts and evidence will also not justify interference vide Wazir Sundar Singh v. Mst. Farida Khanam, AIR 1920 PC 132. Another well established principle while disposing of the application under O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2, C.P.C. is that when the Court while dealing with the case for grant of temporary injunction decides the question of prima facie case, it should apply its judicial mind to the materials which are placed on the record and if it does not do so then it commits illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction and in that case the High Court is competent to interfere in revision in such a case vide Musa v. Badri Prasad (supra). The view taken in Musa v. Badri Prasad (supra) has been followed by Kan Singh J. in Girdhari Lal v. Mahadevi Sharma, AIR 1958 Raj 237. It has been held in this case that the appellate Court should be slow in upsetting a decision of a trial Court in a matter relating to grant of temporary injunction unless the decision of the trial Court is arbitrary, perverse or is not based on sound legal principles. It has been further observed in that case that when the appellate Court does not apply its judicial mind on all the materials brought on the record then in that case the approach of an Appellate Court would be wrong and contrary to the well established principles laid down by the High Court, more so when the appellate Court does not deal with the reasoning that has prevailed with the trial Court and further when it does not apply its judicial