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2023 Supreme(Raj) 305

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR
SUDESH BANSAL, J.
Badruddin Siddiqui – Petitioner
Versus
M/s. R.B. Agencies – Respondent
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15567 of 2022
Decided On : 09-02-2023

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioners: G.D. Bansal, Dharmendra K. Gupta, Arnav Goyal.
For the Respondent: Amit Chhangani.

In a suit for passing off of trademark, the pleadings must contain material facts that establish a cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Vague and casual statements, without specific details or particulars, are insufficient to confer jurisdiction.

Headnote:

TRADEMARK - PASSING OFF - JURISDICTION - SECTION 134(1)(C) OF THE TRADE MARKS ACT, 1999 - SECTION 20 CPC - MATERIAL FACTS - PARTICULAR FACTS - SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADINGS - CAUSES OF ACTION - TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION - COURT'S ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION - RATIO DECIDENDI - FINAL DECISION:

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff filed a suit for passing off of trademark "Lal Qila" under Section 134(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, alleging that the defendant started selling goods under the same name in Jaipur Metropolitan. The defendant challenged the territorial jurisdiction of the Jaipur court, arguing that no cause of action arose within its jurisdiction.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the pleadings in the plaint, particularly in Paragraph 21, were insufficient to establish material facts giving rise to a cause of action within the territory of Jaipur Metropolitan. The court distinguished between "material facts" and "particulars," emphasizing that material facts are essential for establishing a cause of action and must be pleaded, while particulars provide details and embellish material facts.

Issues: 1. Whether the pleadings in the plaint sufficiently established material facts to give rise to a cause of action for passing off within the territory of Jaipur Metropolitan? 2. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in Harkirat Singh v. Amrinder Singh, which held that material facts are those upon which a party relies for its claim or defense and must be pleaded in the pleadings. 2. The court also referred to the Delhi High Court's judgment in RSPL Ltd. v. Mukesh Sharma, which emphasized the need for material facts to be pleaded in a manner that prima facie establishes a cause of action. 3. The court found that the pleadings in Paragraph 21 of the plaint were vague, casual, and lacked specific details, such as the names of shopkeepers or dates, which would have supported the accrual of a cause of action within Jaipur Metropolitan.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the trial court's order that dismissed the suit for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The court found no illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error in the trial court's decision.

ORDER :

1. Instant writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to “the plaintiff”) assailing the order dated 16.08.2022 passed by the District Judge, District Jaipur in Civil Suit No. 31/2018, returning the plaint filed for passing off the Trade Mark action on the ground of having no territorial jurisdiction.

2. Heard learned counsel for both parties, perused the impugned order as well as plaint and other material placed before this Court.

3. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff has filed the present suit under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 on the ground of passing off action, which falls within Section 134 (1) (c) of the Trade Marks Act 1999 (hereinafter referred to “the Act of 1999”). The plaintiff has pleaded that since 10.04.2008, the plaintiff using Trade Mark “Lal Qila” for the business of Paint Brush etc. Undisputedly, the plaintiff has no registration of Trade Mark “Lal Qila.” In Para No. 21 of the plaint, the plaintiff has pleaded in respect of accrual of cause of action for passing off action in the following manner:

    ^^;g fd oknh dks Áfroknh ds mDr d`R; dh lwpuk ,oa tkudkjh fnukad 13-07-2015 dks ÁkIr gqbZ fd Áfroknh }kjk oknh ds VªsMekdZ dh udy dj ^^yky fdyk** ds uke ls jax isUV djus dh czq'k t;iqj egkuxj ds nqdkunkjksa ds ek/;e ls cspuk ÁkjEHk fd;k gS rFkk Áfroknh }kjk bu NksVs&NksVs nqdkunkjksa dks fcy@bUoksbZl vkfn tkjh ugha dh tkrh gS] blfy, bu nqdkunkjksa }kjk Hkh Áfroknh ds eky dk dksbZ fcy@bUoksbZl tkjh ugha fd;k tkrk gS] Áfroknh ds }kjk t;iqj egkuxj esa eky cspus ds dkj.k mDr okn dks ÁLrqr djus dk okn dkj.k mRiUu gqvk gS] tks vHkh rd yxkrkj cnLrwj fujUrj tkjh gSA**

4. In support of aforesaid averments, no other particulars have been placed on record.

5. Respondent-defendant (hereinafter referred to “the defendant”), after service of notice, filed an application under Order 7 Rule 10 and 11 CPC read with Section 20 CPC and disputed the aforesaid pleadings and raised an objection that no jurisdiction has accrued in the Jaipur District and therefore, the plaintiff’s suit is not liable to be entertained in view of Section 20 CPC. For ready reference relevant portion of the application filed by the defendant is as under:

    ^^¼v½ ;g fd oknh }kjk vius okni= dh en la[;k 21 esa okn dkj.k ds lEcU/k esa ;g o.kZu fd;k gS fd ^^oknh dks Áfroknh ds mDr d`R; dh lwpuk ,oa tkudkjh fnukad 13-07-2015 dks ÁkIr gqbZ fd Áfroknh }kjk oknh ds VªsMekdZ dh udy dj ^^yky fdyk** ds uke ls jax jksxu djus dh czq'k t;iqj egkuxj ds nqdkunkjksa ds ek/;e ls cspuk ÁkjEHk fd;k gS rFkk Áfroknh }kjk bu NksVs&NksVs nqdkunkjksa dks fcy@bUoksbZl vkfn tkjh ugha dh tkrh gS] blfy, bu nqdkunkjksa }kjk Hkh Áfroknh ds eky dk dksbZ fcy@bUoksbZl tkjh ugha fd;k tkrk gS] Áfroknh ds }kjk t;iqj egkuxj esa eky cspus ds dkj.k mDr okn dks ÁLrqr djus dk okn dkj.k mRiUu gqvk gS] tks vHkh rd yxkrkj cnLrwj fujUrj tkjh gSA** ijUrq oknh }kjk ,slk dksbZ rF; mDr okni= esa of.kZr ugha fd;k gS fd ftlls ;g lkfcr gksrk gks fd Áfroknh t;iqj egkuxj dk fuoklh gks ;k vius ykHk gsrq dksbZ eky t;iqj egkuxj esa foØ; dj jgk gks vkSj uk gh fdlh ,slh nqdku] ÝsUokbZlh ;k ,tsUV dks i{kdkj cuk;k x;k gS ftlls ;g lkfcr gksrk gks fd Áfroknh }kjk t;iqj egkuxj esa O;kikfjd ykHk gsrq O;kikj fd;k jgk gSA bl Ádkj oknh dk okn /kkjk 20 ds vkKkid Áko/kkuksa ds foijhr gksus ds dkj.k [kkfjt fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA**

6. The trial court, vide impugned order dated 16.08.2022, adverting to provisions of Section 134 (1) (c) of the Act of 1999 and Section 20 CPC as also placing reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. vs. Sanjay Dalia and Another, (2015) 10 SCC 161, has recorded a fact finding that merely on the basis of averments of plaint as made in Para No. 21, it may not be held that any cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff in Jaipur. The plaintiff has neither made the specific and clear averments nor has supported his averments by any documents. For ready

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