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1950 Supreme(Raj) 128

Rajasthan High Court
Bapna and Gupta, JJ.
Kanraj - Appellant
Versus
Vijaisingh - Respondents
D.B. First Apeal No. 2 of 1950
Decided On : August 30, 1950

Advocates Appeared:
Hastimal, for appellant; Sumer Chand, for respondent

Headnote:Evidence Act, S. 114—Postal notice—Endorsement of refusal—Document not produced from proper custody in proper time, not reliable.Transfer of Property Act, s. 131— Notice to debtor by transferee—Copy of plaint whether amounts to notice.Transfer of Property Act, s. 130— Assignment of claim may be impeached like any other contract.Limitation Act, s. 19—Acknowledgment merely keeps alive original contract — It does not create new right.

       If there is nothing to show that the endorsement of refusal was made by an officer of the Post Office and the document is not produced from proper custody in proper time, no reliance can be placed on such endorsement. (Para 9)

       The notice of transfer is to be given by the transferor and if given by transferee it should be alleged or shown that the transferor had refused to sign the notice, although this need not be mentioned in the notice. In the absence of such allegation or proof, a copy of plaint delivered to the debtor along with the service of summons could not be deemed to be a notice of assignment. (paras 10 and 11)

       The words shall be complete and effectual upon the execution of such instrument" in s. 130 T. P. Act, mean that the assignment takes effect from the execution of the instrument irrespective of the notice to the debtor so far as the transferor and the transferee are concerned. It does not mean that the assignment once having been executed cannot be challanged on grounds, including want of consideration on which any other contract can be impeached. (para 19)

       An acknowledgment of liability only allows extension of limitation if made before the expiration of the period of limitation. It does not create a new right but only allowes a new period to run from the date of the acknowledgment. Such acknowledgment does not operate as a new contract but only keeps alive the original cause of action and consequently it cannot form an independent cause of action for a suit. (paras 25 and 26)

Bapna, J—This is an appeal by the plaiatiff in a money suit against one of the defendants.

2. The appellant, Kanraj, filed a suit on the 24th of July, 1948, against the respondent, Vijai Singh, Jagirdar of Ramseen, and one Khub Chand on the allegations that Khub Chand had secured a decree on the 4th of April, 1947, against Mahabbat Singh, father of Vijai Singh, for recovery of Rs. 11,359/7/- (the correct figure is Rs 11,365/7/-), from the Court of Wards, Jodhpur, and Khub Chand thereafter made an assignment of that decree in favour of the appellant on the 25th of July, 1947. It was alleged that the defendant, Vijai Singh, being the heir and legal representative of Mohabbat Singh, and being in possession of the property left by Mohabbat Singh, was liable to pay the amount of the decree, but had refused to do so, and as the Thikana of the defendant was no longer under the Court of Wards, the suit had to be filed by the plaintiff. It was prayed (1) that a decree for recovery of Rs. 11,364/7/-be passed in favour of the plaintiff against Vijai Singh, and (2) that, if defendant No. 2, Khub Chand, had recovered any amount from Vijai Singh towards the decree of the Court of Wards, a decree for such amount be passed against Khub Chand. Interest was claimed from the date of the suit till realization.

3. Vijai Singh by his written statement dated the 24th September, 1948, denied any knowledge of the decree having been passed against his father by the Court of Wards, adding that the order of the Court of Wards, dated the 4th of April, 1947, relied ,upon by the plaintiff, did not amount to a decree. It was pleaded that the said order of the Court of Wards could not be made the basis of the suit against the defendant, and that Khub Chand had, by means of some fraud, obtained the order of the Court of Wards, which was not binding on him.

4. Khub Chand filed a written statement on the 7th of February, 1949 alleging that the assignment had been executed on a promise of payment of Rs. 10,000/-, which sum was never |paid by the plaintiff to Khub Chand, and that, therefore, the agreement of assignment was without consideration and void. It was also alleged that on receipt of the summons of the present suit, the defendant realized the deception caused upon him by the plaintiff, and he made a settlement with the Jagirdar in respect of the debt evidenced by the order of the Court of Wards, and, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief.

Only three issues were framed, viz.,

(1) Whether the agreement of assignment without consideration, and, therefore, invalid ?

(2) Whether the suit was main-tainable on the basis of the order of the Court of Wards ?

(3) Whether the defendant No. 2 had received satisfaction from the defendant No. 1 after the assignment, and if so, what was its effect?

The trial court, after evidence, held that the debt against Vijai Singh was an actionable claim, and its transfer was complete by execution of the deed of assignment, and that therefore any objection as to the invalidity of the transfer for want of consideration could not be agitated under the provisions of section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act. 1 On the second issue it was held that the order of the Superintendent, Court of Wards, dated the 4th of April, i947, was an acknowledgment of the debt in question, which could not be challarged by the holder of the estate even after the release of the estate from the management of the Court of Wards under sections 35 and 47 of the Marwar Court of Wards Act, and that, therefore, the said acknowledgment furnished a valid cauce of action. On the third issue it was held that no notice of assignment had been prove to have been served on Vijai Singh, and, therefore, the settlement made by Vijai Singh with Khub Chand was valid. As a result, the Court passed a decree for Rs. 10,000/-. which was the amount of consideration for the transfer of the actionable claim, against Khub Chand, and the suit was dismissed against Vijai Si












































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