Nawal Kishore C.J.—On the 29th of April, 1948, Lala, Kasamdin, Nagarmal, Ibrahim, Munir, Mohammad and Chhotusingh, in all seven persons, were challaned under Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules in force in the former State of Bikaner, in the Court of First Class Magistrate, Rajgarh, on the ground that they were attempting to smuggle fourteen bags of rice on seven camels out of the State to Shekhawati on the night between the 1st and 2nd of March, 1947. All these persons were convicted by the learned Magistrate on the 12th of July, 1948, and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 400/- each. The camels belonging to them and the bags of rice seized from their possession were confiscated. An appeal was filed in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Churu, but it was dismissed on the 20th of April 1949. Thereafter, only four persons, namely, Ibrahim, Munir, Mohammad and Chhotusingh moved the High Court in revision with the result that on the 18th of November 1949 the order convicting and sentencing them was set aside on the principal ground that the charge as framed by the Magistrate was defective as specific particulars of the manner in which the offence was committed and the precise nature of the offence were not mentioned, after holding that this omission had prejudiced the accused in their defence, the convictions and sentences qua the above mentioned four persons were set aside.

2. After a lapse of nearly two months from the date of the above order of the High Court in revision and after more than nine months from the date on which the learned Sessions Judge had dismissed the appeal, the present application for revision has been preferred in this Court on behalf of the remaining three accused persons, namely, Lala, Kasamdin and Nagarmal and it is urged by the learned counsel on their behalf that the case against all the accused being identical, there is no reason why the order passed by the learned Magistrate of the trial court convicting and sentencing them should not also be set aside. This contention of the learned counsel raises the question whether it is not open to a Judge or Judges of this Court sitting singly or in Division Bench to take in the same case a view which is different from that of another Judge who has dealt with a revision petition preferred on a previous occa-ssion. The learned counsel was unable to support his argument by any authority on the point. He, however, relied upon the provisions of section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and argued that the learned Judge who heard the former revision petition was competent to deal with the cases of the present petitioners and to acquit them even though they had not applied in revision and therefore any other Judge or Judges of the High Court while dealing with the cases of those who had not applied in revision must conform to the judgment of that Judge. We are unable to accept the contention. As it is, though one Division Bench should regard itself bound by the decision of another Division Bench on a question of law, a Judge deciding a case singly is certainly not bound on a question of law by the view of another Judge sitting singly on a previous occasion and is at liberty to differ from it. (Vide Full Bench decision reported in A.I. R. 1940 Mad. 356.) The case of a Division Bench differing from the view taken by a Judge sitting alone stands on stronger footing. As has been observed by Leach C. J. in the above decision, "the Division Bench is the final Court of appeal in an Indian High Court, unless the case is referred to a Full Bench" and it can safely be laid down that it is not bound by any view taken by another Judge of the High Court sitting alone on some previous occasion. In our opinion, it makes no difference whether the cases thus dealt with are entirely independent or connected with each other. Normally speaking, it would indeed be proper that if on a revision preferred by some of the accused persons, a Judge of this Court sitting in Single Bench has

Click Here to Read the rest of this document