Nawal Kishore, J.—This is a first appeal by the plaintiff Mohanlal of Ladnu and arises out of a suit for pre-emption which was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Nagaur.

2. On 16th of March, 1943 Ganpatia and others mortgaged by conditional sale the house in dispute situated at Ladnun in favour of Rasula and his son Hasan for Rs. 1000/- at Rs. 1/9/-per cent per mensem on account of interest. It was stipulated in the mortgage deed that in case the mortgagors failed to redeem the mortgage by repaying the mortgage money within two years, the house will be deemed as having been sold to the mortgagees. This period of two years expired on 16th of March 1945 but nothing seems to have transpired on that day or thereafter till- 6th of June 1947 when the mortgagees obtained a Patta for the house in dispute. On 12th of August 1947, Mohan Lal sued for possession of this house by pre-emption on the ground that it touched his house towards the north. The defendant Rasula for himself and as the guardian of his son Hasan resisted the suit and pleaded that he had a superior right of pre-emption as while the plaintiffs house touched the house in dispute on the back, his house touched it both on the west and the south. He also pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. The two important issues arising out of these pleadings were issues Nos. 1 and 2. The learned District Judge found that though the suit was within limitation, the defendants had a superior right of pre-emption. He accordingly dismissed the suit.

3. The defendants plea as regards their having a superior right of preemption was based on the allegation that they had purchased a house from Chhagana, Malia and Sadasukh on 27th of January 1944 and that this house touched the house in dispute towards the west and the south. Three important questions were agitated in connection with this allegation in the Court below:—

(1) That execution of the sale-deed Ex.D-1 by Chhagana and others in favour of Rasula and his son had not been proved on the record.

(2) That even if the execution of the aforementioned sale-deed was held to have been proved, the house purchased by the defendants did not adjoin the house in dispute.

(3) That in any case, the vendees were not competent in law to improve their position after the date of the sale of the house in dispute.

4. Lengthy arguments have been addressed at the Bar in connection with the above mentioned questions and a large number of authorities cited on the last mentioned point. While the first two questions are questions of fact, we propose to deal with the third question first. It raises an interesting point of law but the correct position does not appear to be in doubt at this time of the day. At one time the view was that where a case for pre-emption is well-founded with reference to the state of things which existed at the time of sale, that cause of action viewed as a valid ground of claim cannot be lost or affected by reason of a new circumstance coming into existence after the sale. There was a Full Bench judgment incorporating the above view reported as 91 P.R. 1909(1) (Dhanna Singh vs. Gurbakash Singh etc.). Rattigan J. however wrote a dissenting judgment. This view was contrary to the view which prevailed in 124 P.R. 1907(2) (Darehan Khan and others vs. Sohaura Mal), where it was held that a vendee can better his position, as for instance, by other acquisitions which give him an equal right with the pre-emptor between the date of the sale in dispute and the institution of the pre-emption suit. So far as the Lahore High Court is concerned, there is no point in pursuing the history of this matter as an authoritative pronouncement is contained in a Full Bench judgment of that Court reported as 1941 Lah. 433(1) (Madho Singh v. James R.R. Skinner (F.B.)). In this judgment, 91, P. R. 1909 was expressly over-ruled and it was held that it cannot be said that the date of sale is the only crucial date for the purpose of determining the right of

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