Sharma, J.—This is the plaintiffs second appeal against the appellate judgment and decree of the learned Additional Dist. Judge, Alwar, who set aside the decree of the Munsif Alwar in a suit for joint possession over certain property and declaration that the defendant No. 1 Sarwansingh was not an adopted son of Nahansingh deceased, and that the plaintiff was the owner of one half share in the property left by the deceased. The plaintiffs case is that according to the following pedigree he, along with Nahansingh is the nearest collateral of Nahansingh & was therefore entitled to one half of the property left by the deceased: —

Dulesingh

Kansingh Arjunsingh Nahansingh Died issueless)

Deft. No.2

Budhasingh(died issueless) Deepsinghplaintiff

Kishansingh SarwansinghDeft. No.1 Madansingh Vijeysingh

2. In March, 1939, the defendant No. 2, taking advantage of his Lambar-dari, got the name of his son Sarwansingh defendant mutated over the whole of the property of Nahansingh, falsely alleging him to be the adopted son of Nahansingh. The plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to joint possession of the property in suit along with Nahansingh, on a declaration that he was entitled to one half of the property of the deceased and that Sarwansingh was not the adopted son of Nahansingh.

3. The defendant Sarwansingh, who is the main defendant, pleaded, inter alia, that he was validly adopted by Nahansingh and that the suit was time barred The learnel Munsif Alwar decided both these points in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. On appeal, however, the learned Addl. Dist. Judge, Alwar, while agreeing with the first court on the point of limitation, disagreed with it on the point of adoption, and held that, under the circumstances of the case, the burden of proof that Sarwansingh was the adopted son of Nahansingh lay on the plaintiff and he has failed to discharge it. He consequently accepted the appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs suit. The plaintiff has come in second appeal to this court.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the burden of proof that Sarwansingh was validly adopted by Nahansingh was on the defendant, and the lower appellate courts judgment is vitiated by an error of law in as much as he wrongly placed the burden of disproving adoption on the plaintiff. It was argued that according to the pedigree given in the plaint, the plaintiff and Nahansingh, defendant No. 2, were in the ordinary course heirs of Nahansingh. The defendant wanted to displace the natural succession by alleging the adoption by Nahansingh. The burden was on the defendant and the lower appellate court ought to have considered the evidence with this angle. It. however, took altogether an erroneous view of the burden of proof in the case and held that the plaintiffs evidence fell short of discharging the burden which lay upon him.

5. On behalf of the respondents, the view of the learned lower appellate court was not seriously supported, but it was argued that even if the burden had been wrongly placed upon the plaintiff, the learned Addl. Dist. Judge had weighed the evidence of both the parties and given the finding that the adoption was proved. Under these circumstances his finding of fact cannot be challenged in second appeal.

6. On behalf of the respondents the decree of the lower appellate court has been supported on yet another grouad which was decided by the lower appellate court against the defendant i. e. the ground of limitation. It was argued that under Art. 118 of the Limitation Act, the limitation for having an adoption declared void is 6 years from the date when the adoption first becomes known to the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff himself the mutation was made in favour of Sarwansingh on 21 st March 1939. Therefore, the suit, which was brought on 28th August 1945, was more than 6 years after the adoption became known and was consequently time barred. It was also argued that the possession of the property in suit was

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