Bapna, J.—This is a reference by a Division Bench of this Court and raises certain important questions.

2. The appellant sued the respondent for recovery of a sum of Rs. 700/-on the basis of a Khata dated Chait Sudi 12, Samwat 1995. The defendant pleaded, inter alia, that the document was a mere acknowledgment and could not form the basis of the suit. The trial court accepted the defence and dismissed the suit, and the same judgment was upheld on appeal. The second appeal came up for hearing before a Singh Judge of this Court, who referred the question—

"Whether acknowledgment of a previous debt not barred by limitation could be the basis of a suit?"

to a Division Bench. In the meanwhile, the same question came up for decision in (Kanraj vs. Vijey Singh), 1950 Rajasthan Law Weekly, before another Division Bench, and it was held that—

"An acknowledgment of liability only allowed extension of limitation if made before expiration of the period of limitation but did not create a new right. It did not operate as a new contract but only kept alive the original cause of action and consequently it could not form an independent cause of action or a basis for a suit."

3. When the reference came up for hearing before the Division Bench, it was argued that there was a Full Bench decision of the former Chief Court of Jodhpur reported in (Mohan Lal vs. Dadu) 1929-30 Marwar Law Reporter 44, in which it had been held that an acknowledgment of liability signed by a debtor formed a good basis of a suit and that the said Full Bench decision was binding on a Division Bench of this Court. Reliance was placed on A.I.R. 1950 Madhya Bharat 31, Dagdu vs. Tulsi Ram. As the question raised was of considerable importance, the case was referred to a Full Bench.

4. In the Madhya Bharat case, (Dagdu vs. Tulsi Ram) a civil second appeal was pending in the High Court of Judicature at Indore, but owing to integration of the various States of Madhya Bharat, the High Court of Indore was abolished and the High Court of the United State of Madhya Bharat was constituted, and the case was transferred to that Court, and came up for hearing before a Single Judge. The point in dispute in the appeal was concluded by a Full Bench decision of the Indore High Court, but the learned Single Judge referred the question of law arising in the case to a Full Bench of the High Court of the United State, and the point arose as to how far the decisions of the High Courts of the Covenanting States should be held to be binding on Judges of the High Court of the United State. It was held that the Indore High Court was a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, and as such the Full Bench decisions of the Indore High Court stood on the same footing as the Full Bench decisions of the High Court of the United State, and were binding on Division Benches and Single Judges until reconsidered by a larger Bench of the High Court of the United State. It was also pointed out that under the constitution of the High Court of the United State, it was laid down that "the High Court shall apply the laws and usages prevailing in any State forming part of the United State to civil, criminal and other proceedings in that State till such time as the duly constituted authority modifies them", and the term law was sufficiently wide to include Judge-made law found in the various decisions of the High Courts of the Covenanting States. The learned Judges of the Madhya Bharat referred to the Full Bench decision of the Rangoon High Court in A.I.R. 1937 Rangoon 4, (In re, Ma Mya vs. Ma Tehin) in which a decision of the Chief Court of Lower Burma was held to be not binding on the Rangoon High Court as the Chief Court of Lower Burma was not a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction.

5. The first question, which arises in the present case is whether the Chief Court of Jodhpur was a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction with the High Court of Rajasthan. It is sufficient to point out one distinguishing feature in order to hold that the Chi

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