Wanchoo, CJ.—This is an application by the Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara; under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. By this application, the applicant challenges the appointment of Shree Sukhdeo Narain, retired judge of the High Court of the former State of Jodhpur, as the Industrial Tribunal under sec. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act (No. XIV of 1947). It may be mentioned that Shree Sukhdeo Narain is no longer working as the Industrial Tribunal now, as his appointment was terminated some time after the present application had been filed, but we have heard arguments on this application in spite of the termination of Shree Sukhdeo Narains appointment, because if the application prevails, the proceedings taken before Shree Sukhdeo Narain will all become void.

2. The main point that has been urged in support of the application is that the appointment is invalid, because Shree Sukhdeo Narain does not fulfil the qualification laid down for a Tribunal under sec. 7 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

3. The main opposition to the application has been made by the State of Rajasthan. It is, in the first place, contended on their behalf that as there are other remedies open to the applicant, it cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In the second place, it is urged that Shree Sukhdeo Narain was qualified within the meaning of section 7 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

4. We shall first deal with the objection that this court should not exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution, as there are other remedies open to the applicant. It is well settled that the extraordinary powers conferred on this court under Article 226 of the Constitution are not to be ordinarily exercised unless there is no other remedy open to an applicant, or, if any remedy is open at all, it is not as convenient, beneficial and effective as the remedy under Art. 226.

5. The contention on behalf of the State, in this connection, is two-fold. In the first place, it is submitted that it is open to the applicant to file a civil suit, and it is pointed out that, as a matter of fact, the applicant has given notice to the State under sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure intimating its intention to file a civil suit. So far as this is concerned, we are definitely of opinion that it is not open to the applicant to file a civil suit in order to get a decree invalidating the appointment of the Industrial Tribunal. We may refer to sec. 9 of the Industrial Disputes Act, which reads as follows:—

"No order of the appropriate Government appointing any person as a member of a Board, Court or Tribunal shall be called in question in any manner."

These words are very wide, and, in our opinion, bar the jurisdiction of the civil courts in this matter. Reference may be made in this connection to section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, which reads as follows :—

"The courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred."

The words used in sec. 9 of the Industrial Disputes Act prohibit the calling into question of any appointment of an Industrial Tribunal "in any manner." These words, in our opinion, impliedly bar the jurisdiction of the civil courts. Whether these words also bar the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 is another matter with which we shall deal subsequently. The first remedy, therefore, of a civil suit is certainly not open to the applicant.

6. The alternative argument on behalf of the State is that even if it is not open to the applicant to file a civil suit, he has the remedy of going in appeal to the Appellate Tribunal constituted under Central Act XLVIII of 1950. Section 7 of that Act, among other things, provides that an appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from any award or decision of an industrial tribunal if the appeal involves any substantial question of

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