Ranawat, J.—This is an application in revision under sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against an order of the Civil Judge, Jaipur City, dated the 9th March 1950 holding that the document which was the basis of the suit was not a pro-note but an agreement. He therefore ordered the plaintiff to pay the deficit stamp duty and on payment of such stamp duty held that the document was admissible into evidence. The plea of the petitioners in this case is that the lower court was wrong in holding that the document was not a pro-note. According to him the requirements of sec. 2 (22) of the Jaipur Stamp Act are satisfied in this case as regards the document which is the basis of the suit and it is contended that the document ought to nave been held to be a pro-note. This objection was raised by the defendant in the lower court and was disallowed.

2. A preliminary objection has been raised by the opposite party in this revision that under sec. 36 of the Jaipur Stamp Act this question cannot be re-agitated in revision that the document in question is inadmissible in evidence. Sec. 36 of the Jaipur Stamp Act lays down that "where an instrument has been admitted in evidence such admission shall not, except as provided in sec. 61, be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped."

3. It is argued by the learned counsel of the petitioner that in the present case this revision was filed no sooner an order was made by the lower court and sec. 36 should therefore not stand in the way of the petitioner. The counsel on the opposite side has put his reliance on the authorities in Nallajerla Satyavati and others vs. Vijjapu Pallya (A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 431) Venkateswara Iyer vs. Ramnatha Dheekshitar (A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 622) Bdupatinath Chakravarti vs. Basanta Kumari Devi (A.I.R. 1936 Cal. 556) and Krishna Kumar Chatterji vs. Mst. Jagpati Kuer and others (A.I.R. 1937 Pat. 73).

4. It may be observed that once a document is admitted in evidence the intention of the legislature is that it should not be questioned on any subsequent stage of the same proceeding on the ground that the document was not admissible for want of stamp duty. The learned counsel of the petitioner has not been able to cite any authority in support of his view directly bearing on this point that if an objection is raised soon after the order of the lower court the provisions of sec. 36 should not be considered to be a bar to such revision application. The plaintiff has, we are told, paid the deficit stamp duty and the document should be considered to have been admitted into evidence by the lower court and we are of opinion that sec. 36 bars the petitioner from reagitating this question in revision. The promptness on the part of the petitioner is no consideration for ignoring the clear provisions of sec. 36 of the Stamp Act.

5. The preliminary objection is allowed and the revision is dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs of this revision.

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