Wanchoo, C.J.—This is an application by Jeewan Ram under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of a writ or order in the nature of mandamus or prohibition or any other suitable writ against the state of Rajasthan and the Collector of Churu.

2. The application has arisen out of an order by the Collector under the Rajasthan Premises (Requisition and Eviction) Ordinance, 1949 (No. XI of 1949). The Collector has passed an order under sec. 3, sub-sec. (4), of the Ordinance requisitioning the house of the applicant. The validity of the order has been challenged on various grounds. In the first place, it is submitted that the Ordinance could not remain in force after the 26th of January, 1950, and, therefore, the Collector had no authority to Act under it. In the second place, it is urged that the Ordinance is void, as it contravenes Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India, and imposes unreasonable restrictions on the exercise by the applicant of his right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. In the third place, it is submitted that as the Ordinance has not received the sanction of the President under Art. 31 (6), it is void in view of the provisions of Art. 31(2). Lastly, it is urged that the Collector had no jurisdiction to pass the order in question, because he did not lay the foundation for such jurisdiction.

3. The application has been opposed on behalf of the state, and all the grounds urged by the applicant have been traversed.

4. So far as the first contention of the applicant is concerned, we have not been able to understand how the coming into force of the Constitution of India on the 26th of January, 1950, has, by that very fact alone, brought the Ordinance to an end. It is true that under Article 385 of the Constitution, the Rajpramukh now promulgates laws by means of Acts; but this Ordinance was promulgated in August, 1949, and, therefore, Article 385 has no application to it. Further, all the existing laws in force have been specifically continued in force under Article 372 of the Constitution, and this Ordinance also, therefore, continued in force after the 26th of January, 1950, unless repealed as provided by law. There is no force, therefore, in this contention.

5. We are further of opinion that there is no force in the second contention that the Ordinance is an unreasonable restriction on the right given to the applicant under Art. 19 (1)(f) of the Constitution. That Article guarantees the fundamental right of acquiring, holding and disposing of property. The restrictions which can be imposed on that right are mentioned in Art. 19(5). Restrictions can be placed on this right, provided they are reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. Item 36 of List II (State List) of the Seventh Schedule specifically provides for requisitioning of property by a State for all purposes except for the purposes of the Union. Item 42 of List III (Concurrent List) also provides for legislation with respect to principles on which compensation for property requisitioned for the purposes of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given. It is, therefore, within the competence of the State Legislature to pass a law relating to requisitioning of property. The preamble to Ordinance No. XI shows that the Ordinance has been passed by reason of the shortage of accomodation in Rajasthan, and power has been given to requisition any premises for any public purpose. It cannot, in our opinion, be said that such requisition is an unreasonable restriction on the right to acquire, hold or dispose of the property. It has been urged that the Ordinance is a permanent Ordinance, and, therefore, the State can requisition any premises for ever. The fact, however, that the Ordinance is a permanent law does not mean that the requisition would always be mad

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