Rajasthan High Court
Wanchoo, C.J. and Bapna, J.
Pyarchand - Appellant
Versus
Dungarsingh - Respondents
Civil Revision No. 83 of 1950
Decided On : July 18, 1952
The nature of the order to be revised under sec. 115 should be such as to be concerned with jurisdiction; if the order in revision has nothing to do with a question of jurisdiction, either with its exercise or its nont-exercise or illegality or material irregularity in its exercise, the High Court will not interfere and consequently, will not entertain the revision. But before the High Court goes into the question whether the order is of this nature, the preliminary conditions mentioned in the first part of sec. 115 have to be fulfilled. These preliminary conditions are three in number, (1) there should be a case decided, (2) the decision should be of any court I subordinate to the High Court and (3) no appeal should lie from that decision to the High Court. If any of these three conditions is absent, the High Court will not be competent to entertain the revision even though the point raised in the revision is a question of jurisdiction and is covered by clauses (a), (b) or (c) of sec. 115.
A case is said to be decided when the Court considers any state of facts juridically and gives a decision relating to a question in controversy between the parties affecting their rights. This is, however, not enough to make the revision entertainable. It has further to be shown that no appeal lies from that order to the High Court whether directly or indirectly. If there is a direct appeal to the High Court, namely, a first appeal, the revision will not be competent. Even if there is an indirect appeal, namely, a second appeal or the order in question can be taken in either first or second appeal to the High Court taking a ground of appeal under sec. 105, the High Court will not be competent to entertain a revision.
2. Dungarsingh, opposite party, filed a suit against Pyarchand and others in October 1944 praying that a certain arbitration award dated 20th of April, 1944, may be ordered to be filed and a decree passed in accordance with it. The parties are descended from a common ancestor, Dungarsingh belonging to one branch and the applicants Pyarchand and others belonging to another. There were disputes between the parties about partition of their ancestral property and litigation was going on. In one such litigation, there was a revision to the High Court of the former State of Mewar. In the course of the proceedings in the High Court, parties appointed one Tejsingh Kothari as arbitrator to arbitrate all disputes between them which were on that date pending in courts. It was also provided that those disputes between the parties which were not then pending in courts would also be decided by this arbitrator. The arbitrator gave an award on the 20th of April 1944 and filed it in the High Court at Udaipur on the same day. Thereafter Dungarsingh applied to the High Court at Udaipur for passing a decree in terms of the award on the 1st of July 1944. That application was disposed of by the High Court in September 1946 and the parties were directed to approach directly the courts where litigation was pending. In the meantime, the present suit was filed by Dungarsingh in the Court of the District Judge at Udaipur with a certified copy of the award on a court-fee stamp of Rs. 5/-. There was a report by the office that the court-fee was insufficient and the application was returned to Dungarsingh on the 31st of October 1944. He presented it again on the 28th of November 1944 and contended that the court-fee paid was sufficient. This question was agitated before the District Judge and on the 21st of February 1945, he ordered that the case be registered subject to arguments being heard later on the question whether the court-fee paid was deficient. When the present applicants appeared before the District Judge, they opposed the application on the grounds of limitation and insufficiency of court-fee among other grounds. The District Judge decided that the court-fee paid was sufficient and that the application was not bar-red by limitation, and ordered the proceedings to go on. Thereupon a revision was filed in the High Court of the former State of Mewar on the 10th February 1948 against this order. That revision came to this Court on its establishment and was put up for hearing before a learned single Judge on the 12th of January 1951. He then made a reference to a Division Bench with the following order :—
"In this revision petition intricate and important points of law are involved. The first is whether or not the order sought to be revised decides a case and whether or not a revision petition is competent against it
The second is whether the application of the non-petitioner in this revision petition for filing of the award was an application relating to matters in respect of which there was no case pending before the court and whether that application was governed by Art. 32 of the Mewar Limitation Act. It is proper that the points are decided by a Division Bench".
3. The matter then came up for hearing before a Division Bench. As by that time the learned Judge, who had made the reference, was no longer on the Bench of this Court, it was ordered by the Chief Justice on the 19th of March 1952 that the whole case will be decided by the Bench before which the reference was pending. The whole case is, therefore, now before this Bench for decision.
4. The first question which has been argued at length is whether the order sought to be revised decides a case and whether a revision petition is competent against it. I, therefore, propose to decide this question first before taking up the other question that has been referred by the learned Judge as well as
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