Sharma, J.—This is an appeal by Lalchand wh6 is being prosecuted in the Court of the First Assistant City Magistrate, Jaipur, for an offence under sec. 6 read with sec. 8 of the Jaipur Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1947, hereinafter to be referred to as the Jaipur Act, on the allegation that he exported certain iron girders from Jaipur West Railway Station to Pokaran in Marwar on the 5th April, 1949 in contravention of sec. 5 (a) of the Iron and Steel Control (Production and Distribution) Order of 1947, hereinafter to be referred to as the Jaipur Order. One Nanulal was also challaned along with him but he was discharged by the learned Magistrate. Lalchand has come in revision to this Court and the follow-ing two points are raised on his behalf—

(1) that the Jaipur Act was repeated on the 2oth July 1949 by the Rajasthan Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance, 1949, hereinafter to be referred to as the Rajasthan Ordinance, which was published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated the 10th August 1949 and the Rajasthan Ordinance did not save any prosecutions launched under the Jaipur Act.

(2) that no prima facie case was made out against the accused.

2. Taking up the first ground first, which, to our mind, is in fact the most important ground in the case, it was argued by the learned counsel on , behalf of the accused that by, sec. 20, (1) of the Rajasthan Ordinance, the Jaipur. Act was repeated. There is no , provision in the Rajasthan Ordinance by which prosecutions launched under . the Jaipur Order could be, saved. It was argued that sec. 6 of the General Glauses Act does not apply to the present case as the General Clauses Act was not in force in Rajasthan at the time when the Rajasthan Ordinance was promulgated. It was further argued that even if it be taken that the Central General Clauses Act applied to Rajasthan (which in fact did not apply), sec. 6 would not apply all the same, because it applies only to the cases where a former. Act is simply repeated and another one substituted in its place. For this reliance was placed upon two, rulings of the Allahabad High Court one reported in Firm. Danmal Parshotamdas vs. Firm Babu-ram Chhotelal (A.I.R. 1936 All. 3), and Benaras Bank Ltd. vs. Shri Sri Prakash, Bhagwan Das and others (A.I.R. 1946 All. 269). In the first of these two rulings there are following observations of Suleman, C.J. from which it was inferred that sep. 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act applies to those cases only where a previous law has been simply repealed and there is no fresh legislation to take its place. "Where an old law has been merely repealed then the repeal would not affect any previous right acquired nor would it even affect a suit instituted subsequently in respect of a right previously so acquired." These ob-servations of Suleman, C.J. were quoted with approval by Braund, J. in the second ruling of the Allahabad High Court above referred to. It was further argued that whatever the Rajasthan Ordinance intended to save out of the orders or other things arising out of the Jaipur Act were expressly saved by sec. 20 (2) of, the Rajasthan Ordinance. By that sub-section it was provided that—

"any order made,or deemed to be made under the repeated Acts, Ordinances and laws and in force . immediately before the commencement of Rajasthan Ordinance shall continue in force and be deemed to be an order made under the Ordinance and all appointments made, licenses or permits granted, directions issued, things done and action taken under any such order and in force immediately before such commencement shall likewise continue in force and be deemed to be made, granted, issued, done or taken in pursuance of the Rajasthan Ordinance."

3. That was the only provision which related to saving and it did not save any action taken under any of the repealed Acts | and therefore the present prosecution which was launched under the Jaipur Act could not be saved.

4. On behalf of the prosecution it was conceded by

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