Wanchoo, C.J.—This is an appeal by Jagjivan Singh, judgment-debtor, in execution proceedings and arises in the following circumstances:—

Sitaram, decree - holder, brought a suit for ejectment of Jagjivan Singh from a house, of which Jagjivan Singh was a tenant. The ground on which the ejectment was prayed was that arrears of rent were due and the house was required by the landlord for his own personal use. The suit was dismissed by the trial court so far as the prayer for ejectment was concerned. Thereupon there was an appeal to the Additional District Judge and a compromise was arrived at between the parties. On the basis of this compromise, Jagjivan Singh agreed to hand over possession of the house within ten months and a decree was passed accordingly on the 30th of September 1950. At that time, the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act No. XVII of 1950) was not in force; but the Marwar House Rent Control Act, 1949 was in force. When the period of ten months came to end, the decree-holder Sitaram applied for execution of the decree by ejectment. Thereupon an. objection was taken by the judgment-debtor Jagjivan Singh that the decree was; not executable and reliance was placed on sec. 26 of the Rajasthan Act. It seems that that section was not mentioned in the application of objection; but the case for the judgment-debtor rested both in the first court and before the lower appellate court on sec. 25. Both the courts have held that the decree was executable. Hence this second appeal.

2. The main question that arises for determination now is the scope and extent of sec. 26 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act No. XVII of 1950). That section reads as follows—

"No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any premises in areas to which this Act extends for the time being, passed before the date of commencement of this Act, shall in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force therein, except on any of the grounds mentioned in sec. 13 and under the circumstances specified in this Act."

3. The contention on behalf of the appellant is that it was the duty of the executing court to see whether any of the grounds mentioned in sec. 13 existed before putting this decree, which had been passed before the Act came into force in December 1950, into execution. Leaving out the unnecessary words, the section would read like this—

"No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any premises__..... shall.........be executed against him .........except on any of the grounds mentioned in sec. 13.".........

The section, therefore, clearly casts a duty on the executing court, before it proceeds to execute a decree passed before the Act came into force, to see that one or the other of the conditions mentioned in sec. 13 is satisfied. It was urged on behalf of the respondent that if the executing court has to see to this, it will create a rather curious situation and the executing court may come to a conclusion which might be different from that to which trial court had come on any of the conditions mentioned in sec. 13. I do not think, however, that there would be any conflict between the trial court and the executing court on this point. Under Sec. 26 it would be for the executing court to satisfy itself that one or the other of the conditions mentioned in sec. 26 is present before it executes any decree passed before the Act came into force. It can satisfy itself on this point in one of two ways. If the question, whether any of the conditions mentioned in sec. 13 exists, was agitated in the trial court and decided in favour of the landlord, the executing court will, on the principle of res judicata, accept that decision inter parties and be satisfied that decree could be executed. If on the other hand, no such question under sec. 13 was raised or if any such question was raised but never decided, it would be for the executing cou

Click Here to Read the rest of this document