WANCHOO, C J.—This is a reference by a Division Bench of this Court, and the following two questions have been referred to the Full Bench for reply:—

(1) Whether the provisions of sec. 8(1) (c) (ii) (iii) iv) read with sec. 12 of the Court of Wards Act are inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 14 and 19 (i) (f) and (5) of the Constitution.

(2) Whether the provisions of sec. 9 (3) of the Court of Wards Act of 1951 is repugnant to Art. (19) (i) (f) and (5) of the Constitution of India ?

2. The facts, which have led to this reference, may be briefly narrated. The applicant Rao Bhagwatsingh is the jagirdar of Duni. The Government is intending to take action under sec. 8 (1) (c) of the Court of Wards Act, 1951, for declaring the applicant incapable of managing or unfitted to manage his estate, and in that connection the Collector of Jaipur has been directed to make an enquiry under sec, 9(1) of the Act into the circumstances of the applicant, and the extent of his indebtedness. The applicant, thereupon, contended before the Collector that certain provisions of the Court of Wards Act were ultra vires. He also gave notice to the State not to proceed against him under sec. 8(1) (c) of the Act. As the State is proceeding with the matter, and the Collector is continuing the enquiry under sec. 9 (1), the applicant made this application under Art. 226 to this Court. By that application he challenged the validity of certain provisions in the Court of Wards Act, 1951, and this reference is with respect to those provisions. Sec. 8 (1) read as follows: —

"Land-holders shall be deemed to be disqualified to manage their own estate when they are—

(a) Minors;

(b) Persons adjudged by a competent civil court to be of unsound mind and incapable of managing their own estate ;

(c) persons declared by the Government to be incapable of managing or unfitted to manage their own estate.

(i).... ............

(ii) owing to their having been convicted of a non-bailable offence or being unfitted vicious habits or bad character for the management of their own estate,

(iii) owing to their having entered upon a course of extravagance,

(iv) owing to their failure without sufficient reason to discharge the debt and liabilities due by them,

(v) owing to such mismanagement as has caused general discontent among the tenants."

3. The attack in the present case in against sec. 8(l)(c)(ii)(iii) and (vi), and the contention of the applicant is that these provisions, which result in depriving him of his property and thus violating his fundamental right of holding his property under Art. 19(i)(f), are ultra vires, because they are not saved by Art. 19(5) on the ground of their being reasonable restrictions on his right of holding his property. It is urged that the substantive provisions are so vague that they cannot be held as reasonable restrictions, and further that the procedural provisions are of such a nature that they also cannot be upheld as reasonable restrictions.

4. It is well settled that the court has to look at both the substantive and the procedural aspects of the impugned restrictions in order judge the reasonableness of the provisions and in this connection the following observations in The State of Madras vs. V. G. Row (1) (AIR 1952 S.C. 196.) at p. 199 may be quoted with advantage :—

"Both the substantive and the procedural aspects of the impugned restrictive law should be examined from the point of view of reasonableness ; that is to say, the court should consider not only factors such as the duration and the extent of the restrictions, but also the circumstances under which and the manner in which their imposition has been authorised. It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlyi

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