MODI, J.—This is a second appeal by the defendant Budharam in a suit for cancellation of adoption and for possession.

2. It is necessary to give a brief pedigree table explaining the relationship between the parties in order properly to understand and appreciate the contentions between them:—

Khiyani

Moola = Mst. Rukma (widow) Mukhram|

Daughter = Daughters husband Doongra Beerbal & others (plaintiffs)

Budhram(Deft. No.1 Appellant) Khyali(Deft.2 Chetram(Deft.3)

3. The dispute relates to the property of the deceased Moola. The plaintiffs case was that Moola had died without any male heir but that on 18.7.1925, her widow Mst. Rukma took in adoption her son-in-law Doonga. It was contended that this adoption was invalid in law and contrary to the custom prevalent in the family of the parties. It was also alleged that the property in dispute was the joint ancestral property of the common ancestor Khiyani. Mst. Rukma died some time in Baisakh of Svt. 2003 corresponding to April, 1945. The plaintiffs brought their present suit on her death on 18th February, 1946, in which they prayed for a declaration that the adoption of Doonga was against law and custom and they also prayed for possession as the nearest reversioners of the last holder Moola. The suit was resisted by Budhram, as his father Doonga was dead. The suit was contested on a number of grounds but it is only necessary to refer to two of them for the purposes of the present appeal, and these were that the adoption was valid, both in law and in accordance with custom, and further that the plaintiffs suit was barred by limitation, as they had knowledge of the adoption right from 1925 when it was made.

4. The trial court found that according to the custom in vogue in the family of the parties, the adoption of a daughters husband was invalid. It also found that the suit was within limitation and consequently decreed the suit. The learned District Judge Ganganagar on appeal upheld the judgment and decree of the trial court. This appeal has been filed from that judgment and decree.

5. It has been strenuously contended by learned counsel for the defendant appellant before me that the judgment of the learned District Judge was quite unsatisfactory and that he had disposed of the case under the belief that the burden of proving the validity of adoption lay upon the defendants. Learned counsel further urged that the learned District Judge had not dealt with the question of custom at all, nor with the question of limitation. I am of opinion that although the judgment of the learned District Judge is not as satisfactory as it should have been, there is no escape from the conclusion that this appeal must be dismissed. I have arrived at this conclusion mainly on the ground that the adoption on which learned counsel for the defendant relies is not a valid adoption in law. The adoption in the present case was made of Doonga by Mst. Rukma by a deed dated 18th July, 1925. The learned District Judge found in his judgment that Mst. Rukma had taken by this deed Doonga in adoption to herself and not to her husband. I have carefully read the deed of adoption and have come to the same conclusion Mst. Rukma in this deed has stated that as she had no son of her own body, she was taking her son-in-law Doonga in adoption. She further stated that Doonga would remain in her "tith". It is significant that the does not mention the "tith" of her husband. It is further remarkable that there is not the slightest reference to her husband by Mst. Rukma in this deed. In these circumstances, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that what Mst. Rukma wanted to do in the present case was to take a son in adoption to herself and not to her husband. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that there was no specific issue on this point, that there was no evidence on it either and that a presumption must be made in favour of the validity of the adoption, and, therefore, it must be presumed that the adop

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