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1953 Supreme(Raj) 209

Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench
Sharma, J.
Jagdish Chand - Appellant
Versus
Durgaprasad - Respondents
C. Rev. No. 128 of 1950
Decided On : October 13, 1953

Advocates Appeared:
Ram Avtar Gupta, for Applicant; Daulatmal Bhandari, for Opposite Party

Headnote:Arbitration Act, sec. 47—Consent means consent after making of award.

       From the Wordings of the sec. 47 it is clear that the consent required by the proviso is not the consent prior to the making of the award but it is the consent after the award has been made. (Para 6)

SHARMA, J.—This application for revision has been filed by Jagdish Chand plaintiff against the order of the learned Civil Judge, Bharatpur, remanding the plaintiffs suit for decision on merits. The suit was for the recovery of Rs. 2100/- and was directed against Durgaprasad and Badriprasad. It was filed in the court of Civil Judge, Bharatpur, on the 9th July, 1947 and was registered on the 7th of November, 1947. On 2nd December, 1948 an Iqrarnama for the decision of the suit by arbitration was made between the parties and Pannalal was made the sole arbitrator. The arbitrator on that very day gave an award exempting Badriprasad and giving a decree against Durgaprasad for a sum of Rs. 1350/-. Durgaprasad did not accept this award and refused to be bound by it. Jagdish Chand, however, filed this award on the 10th of February, 1949 along with the agreement for arbitration in the court of Munsif, Bayana, to which court the case had by that time come by transfer, and prayed that the suit be decided in accordance with the award. Notice was issued to Durgaprasad who denied the execution of the agreement and said that the award was invalid. Learned Munsif, however, decided on the 14th of September, 1949 that the agreement was duly executed by the parties and that the award operated as a compromise and decreed the suit in terms of the award. Against the order and decree of the Munsif, the defendant Durgaprasad went in appeal and challenged the order of the Munsif on the ground that the agreement for arbitration was not duly executed by him and that the award in any event cannot operate as a compromise by virtue of the proviso to sec. 47 of the Arbitration Act of 1940. Learned Civil Judge, who heard the appeal, agreed with the Munsif that the agreement for arbitration was duly executed by the parties but held that the award was unenforceable by virtue of the proviso to sec. 47 of the Arbitration Act. He consequently set aside the order and decree of the Munsif and remanded the case for decision on merits. Against this order of the learned Civil Judge, Bharatpur the plaintiff has came in revision to this Court.

2. I have heard Mr. Ram Avtar Gupta on behalf of the applicant, who argued that the award could be taken as an adjustment of the suit between the parties and that sec. 47 did not bar its being acted upon. He relied upon a Division Bench case of Madras High Court in V.S.A. Arumuga Mudaliar vs. V.S.P. Balasubramania Mudaliar and others (1) (AIR 1945 Mad. 294.) and a Full Bench case of Allahabad High Court in Dular Koeri and others vs. Payag Koeri(2) (AIR 1942 All. 145.).

3. On behalf of the opposite party Mr. D. M. Bhandari argued that the Allahabad ruling relied on by the learned counsel for the applicant has no application to the facts of the present case, because the agreement for arbitration and award were not governed by the provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940, but the Schedule II of Civil Procedure Code, wherein there was no provision like the proviso to sec. 47 of the Arbitration Act. As regards the Madras ruling it was argued that it had been over-ruled by a very recent decision of the Full Bench of the same Court in the case of Abdul Rahman Sahib vs. Muhammad Siddiq and another(l). It was also argued that a revision did not lie in this case because the order of the learned Civil Judge could be challenged in an appeal which might be filed against the decree in the suit.

4. So far as the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the opposite party is concerned, I do not think it necessary to express an opinion thereon because to my mind this application for revision fails on merits.

5. Coming to the merits, I find from the language of sec. 47 of the Arbitration Act that an award which is not obtained in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act can be taken into consideration as a compromise or adjustment of a suit only when all the parties interested give their consent to its being so used. For the sake


















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