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1955 Supreme(Raj) 312

Rajasthan High Court
Wanchoo C.J. & Dave, J.
Arjun Singh - Appellant
Versus
Teekchand - Respondents
Civil Writ No. 5 of 1955
Decided On : October 20, 1955

Advocates Appeared:
Murlimanohar, for Petitioner; L.N. Chhangani, Government Advocate

Headnote:(a) Municipalities —Bikaner Municipal Act 1923, sec. 15—Eztension to be before expiry of term.) para 4.(b) Municipalities—Rajasthan Municipal Boards, Extension of terms Act 1952,—Scope-Purposes of Act.(c) Municipalities—Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, sec. 47—Provisions only directory not mandatory—Non-compliance would not make rules or bye laws invalid. (Para 9)(d) Constitution of India, Part XIII—Plea that taxes heavy—Courts not entitled to adjudicate.(e) Municipalities—Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act. sec. 2(b)—Scope and applicability-Section validates only taxes which State legislature entitled to impose—Export Tax in Karanpur under Bikaner Municipal Act invalid after Bikaner Municipal Act came to end in 1951.(f) Municipalities—Export Tax—Validity(g) Municipalities—Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, sec. 2(b)—"So far as may be"

       The Act of 1952 would apply to such Boards whose terms had expired before this Act was passed, or whose terms were likely to expire before the electoral rolls were finally ready. Unless therefore the applicant can show that the electoral rolls were finally ready before the terms of the Board expired, extension by the Government under sec. 2 would be for purposes of the Act. (Para 5)

       The would, object of going retrospective extension to the terms of Municipal Boards is to validate every that done during that period. If this effect was not to follow the extension under sec.2 of 1952 Act would have no meaning. (Para 6)

       There is no provision in Part XIII of the constitution enable the court to adjudicate on whether the taxes imposed are heavy and therefore unreasonable. It is therefore not open to the courts to sit in judgment over the Taxing Authorities, and consider whether particular taxes imposed under a law passed under Art. 304 are heavy and therefore unreasonable resulting in undue restraint on trade and commerce. (Para 12)

       After the coming into force of the Constitution, the Legislature of Rajasthan could not impose a tax which was not covered by Lists II and III of the Constitution. If there was any tax, which was not covered by lists II and III of the Constitution, it could only be imposed by the Union Government under item 97 of List I. Therefore, when sec.2(b) of the Act lays down that all taxes imposed shall be deemed, so far as may be, to have been imposed under this Act, it can only refer to such taxes which can be imposed by the State Legislature under its powers in List II and List III. It is true that in sec. 59 of the Act there is provision for imposing any other tax to the nature and object of which the approval of the Government shall have been obtained prior to the selection contemplated in clause (a) of sec. 60. But this residuary clause cannot, authorise the imposition of a tax which it was not within the power of the State legislature to impose at all under Lists II and III. An export tax like the one imposed in 1933 cannot admittedly be imposed under Lists II and III, and can only be imposed under item 97 of List I. Therefore when under sec, 2(b) the Rajasthan Legislature was continuing taxes which were in existence in the municipalities before the Act was passed, it could only continue those taxes which it had the power to impose. If it had no power to impose a tax, like the export tax in dispute, it could hot, by using the words "shall so far as maybe......be deemed......to have been imposed .... under this Act" mean to continue a tax under the Act, which it could not impose at all. Therefore, this tax, which was imposed by the notification of the 29th of July, 1933, cannot be deemed to have been continued by sec. 2(b) of the Act which repealed the Bikaner Municipal Act. Even if this export tax could continue under Art. 277 so long as the Bikaner Act was in force by virtue of Art. 362, it must be deemed to have coma to an end when the Act was passed in 1951. On the passing of the Act in 1951, such a tax, not being within the power of Rajasthan Legislature to impose, could not be and was not continued under sec. 2(b) of the Act. (Para 15)

Wanchoo, C. J.—This is an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India by Arjun Singh for the issue of a writ of quo warranto and mandamus or any other suitable writ or order against the respondents, asking them not to collect any tax from the applicant.

2. The main respondent in the case is the Municipal Board of Karanpur (hereinafter called the Board) through the Secretary, and the State has also been made a party along with the Chairman and members of the Board. The main relief claimed by the applicant is that the Board should be asked not to collect any tax from the petitioner. The grounds on which this relief is claimed may be narrated seriatim:

(1) The term of office of the chairman and the members of the Board expired on the 27th of September, 1954, if not earlier, and as such, the chairman and the members cannot legally function, and were not authorised to collect taxes, or to appoint persons for that purpose, and the persons so appointed were not authorised to demand and collect taxes.

(2) The Board did not follow the procedure prescribed under the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act (No. XXIII) of 1951 (hereinafter called the Act), and did non publish the proposed rules, bye-laws and rates, as required by sec. 60, and never invited objections from the public, as required by sec. 61 of the Act.

(3) The Board did not publish the rules, and rates as required by sec. 62 of the Act after their sanction by the Government.

(4) The rules, bye-laws and rates, and the copies of the Act have not been printed, published and made available to the public in Hindi as required by sec. 47 of the Act.

(5) No octroi limits and stations have been fixed, and no bye-laws framed for fixing them, or for other matters mentioned in sec. 46 (1) (k) of the Act, and the procedure prescribed under sec. 66(2) has not been followed.

(6) The taxes are heavy and unreasonable, and are an undue restraint on trade and commerce, and thus invalid under sec 301 of the Constitution.

(7) The Board has no authority to charge export duty on the goods on which it is chargeable.

3. The application has been opposed on behalf of the Board, and it has traversed all the points of law and fact raised on behalf of the applicant. We shall deal with these points now one by ope.

4. (1) So far as the constitution of the Board is concerned, it appears that the members of the Board were elected sometime in January, 1951, and the notification under sec 23 of the Bikaner Municipal Act (No VI) of 1923, which was made on the 17th of March. 1951, and the first meeting of the Board was held on the 4th of April, 1951, in which the President and the Vice President were elected. The contention of the applicant, therefore, is that at the latest the Board can be said to have come into existence from the 4th of April, 1951, and its life came to an end after three years, i.e. on the 3rd of April, 1954. It appears that the Board, however continued to function even afterwards and on the 25th of November, 1954, the term was extended under sec. 15 of the Act up to the 31st March, 1955, or till the new Board took over, whichever was earlier. This notification, however, was obviously after the term of the Board had expired, and sec. 15 of the Act does not contemplate a notification extending the term of the Board after it has expired. Extension under sec. 15 of the Act, in our opinion has to be before the term of the Board expires. While, however, arguments were proceeding in this Court, the Government came out with another notification, dated the 18th of September, 1955. This notification was under sec. 2 of the Rajasthan Municipal Board Extension of Terms Act (No. XXV) of 1952. By this notification the term of the Boards was extended retrospectively up to the 31st of December, 1955, by which date the new elections were expected to be completed. When therefore, the arguments proceeded further the Board and its Chairman depended upon this notification for the continuance of the Board from the




















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