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Rajasthan High Court
Modi, J.
Mst. Gulab Kunwar - Appellant
Versus
Askran - Respondents
S.B. Civil Regular Second Appeal No.38 of 1953
Decided On : December 13, 1955
An agreement made at the time of adoption regulating the right of the widow as against the adopted son and reserving a benefit in her favour even to the extent of the life interest in the whole property would not be incompatible with his position as a son.
In the introductory part of the deed, Mst. G. stated that she was an old woman of 61 years of age and that she had no son and that she was desirous of continuing the line of her deceased husband by an adoption and, therefore, she was taking M. (age 30 yrs.) son of Milapchand, who was a relation of her, in adoption. The lady then went on to State that M. would thenceforward be the malik of the entire estate of her husband, movable and immovable, and that M. would do business in the name of Milapchand and that M. would have all the rights of a born son in the new family.
If the adoption deed had ended here, there would have been no trouble whatsoever as to the import of this instrument. But Mst. G. was obviously anxious to safeguard her own rights in her old age and the deed want on further like this. "And on the entire property of my husband, movable and immovable property, ownership title shall remain with me till my life and cheeru M shall not raise any objection to the exercise of my discretion in the use of whatever money, in good deeds of good name, pilgrimage, religion charity etc., and shall always remain at my finding; and after I complete my one hundred years ownership title shall be of cheeru M. over all property, movable and immovable property, and money in transaction." The latter signed the deed apparently in token of his consent to the terms thereof.
Held that it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of documents that the proper way to construe a document is to read it as a whole and to give each component part thereof due emphasis and attention and thereby ascertain the true intention of the parties to it. Further where a document contains two sets of recitals therein, which are not absolutely consistent with each other, there is yet another rule which must be borne in mind and that is that in such a case we must give effect to every part of the document if we can and arrive at a harmonious result. Applying these principles of construction to the deed clearly the intention of the parties was not to give an absolute estate to the adoptive widow but to reserve a life interest in her favour as regards her husbands property and postpone the rights of the adopted son during her life time. It is only by reading the document in this way that it is possible to give effect to it as a whole and to every component part thereof without doing any violence to or sacrificing the one part of it for the sake of other. The first and the last part of the document clearly recited that M. was to be the owner of the entire estate left by the deceased Milapchand. But this estate was to be postponed in favour of Mst. G. the adoptive mother during her life-time.
The contention that by the terms of the deed, the widow had given to herself an absolute estate and thereby completely cut down the rights of the adopted son to a mere nothing is incorrect and must be repelled. Consequently, there is no scope for the suggestion that the adoption made in this case was contrary to the fundamental principles of the Hindu Law of adoption as administered at this date and the limitation by which the rights of the adopted son were postponed in favour of the adoptive mother for her life-time, as contained in the deed of adoption here are valid.
2. The facts out of which this appeal arises have been narrated at length in that order and need not be repeated fully. It is enough to state that the plaintiffs case was that Jethmal, father of the defendant respondent, had taken the suit shop on rent from the plaintiff by a rent-note dated the 22nd February, 1932, the rent settled being Rs. 5/P.m. After Jethmals death, his son, who is the defendant respondent, continued to pay the rent for some time but thereafter failed to pay it with the result that the plaintiff gave him a notice on the 25th June, 1946, asking him to quit within seven days of the receipt of the notice and in default to be liable to pay rent at an enhanced rate of Rs.20/- per mensem. The defendant did not comply with the notice and, therefore, the plaintiff brought the suit, out of which this appeal arises, on the 17th December, 1946. The defendant contested the suit on all possible pleas and I have already disposed of all of them except one by my order dated the 7th January, 1955. I have held that there can be no question at this stage as to the execution of the rent-note by the defendants father, which has been held by the two courts to have been so executed; that the rent-note covered not only the shop on the ground floor but the malia or the room on the roof thereof and the defendant was a defaulter having not paid rent from 17th Jan., 1946 to 17th Dec., 1946, and, was, therefore liable to be evicted. It has also been held by me that the plaintiff could claim enhanced rent at the rate of Rs. 12/8/-per mensem from the date of the notice but no more. The main question which now remains to deal with and which had prevailed with the lower appellate court resulting in the dismissal of the plaintiffs suit is whether the plaintiff had any locus standi to bring this suit as she had admittedly taken one Misrilal in adoption to her husband before the suit was filed. For the reasons which I have stated at length in my earlier order and which it is entirely unnecessary to re-iterate, I considered it necessary to frame a specific issue on this question and remitted it to the trial court for a finding thereon. That issue was as follows—
Whether the plaintiff Mst. Gulab Kunwar was divested of her right as regards the suit property by force of the adoption made by her of Misrilal, and whether she had no right to bring the present suit?
The finding of the trial court is that Mst. Gulab Kunwar has not been divested of her right with respect to the suit property on account of the adoption of Misrilal and that the had a right to bring this suit. The question for determination, therefore, is whether this finding is correct. Learned counsel for the respondent tenant has strenuously opposed it and his contention is that the deed of adoption executed by Mst. Gulab Kunwar in favour of his adopted son Misrilal and by which the rights of the latter were curtailed was entirely of no effect in so far as the rights of the adopted son were diminished by it. This brings me to a consideration of the terms of the deed of adoption. In the introductory part of the deed Mst. Gulab Kunwar stated that she was an old woman of 61 years of age and that she had no son and that she was desirous of continuing the line of her deceased husband by an adoption and, therefore, she was taking Misrilal son of Milap Chand, who was a relation of her, in adoption to her husband. The lady then went on to state that Misrilal would thenceforward be the malik of the entire estate of her husband, movable and immovable, and that Misrilal would do business in the name of Milapchand and that Misrilal would have all the rights of a born son in the new family. If the adop-tion-deed had ended here, there would have been no trouble whatsoever as to the import of this instrument. But Mst.
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